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THE WAY IT IS AND THE WAY IT SHOULD BE: LIABILITY
UNDER §10(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND RULE 10b-5
THEREUNDER FOR MAKING FALSE AND MISLEADING
STATEMENTS AS PART OF A SCHEME TO "PUMP AND
DUMP" A STOCK
BY: DAVID B. KRAMER*
"There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.
Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive
upon mystery and secrecy."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")
provides in relevant part that, "[i] t shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange ... any manipulative or deceptive
device...." 2 Courts have held that in order to state a claim under §10(b), a
plaintiff must allege, among other things, "material misstatements or
omissions" indicating an intent to fraudulently induce a person into either

*

David B. Kramer is an associate at Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy, and Ecker, P.A. in

Rockville, Maryland. His practice focuses on defending corporations and individuals being investigated
for alleged securities frauds and other white collar crimes. In addition, Mr. Kramer's practice includes
offering corporate counseling on a wide range of issues from US Securities and Exchange filings to
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance. He would like to offer special thanks to Professor Donald C. Langevoort
and Professor John Reed Stark at the Georgetown University Law Center as well as his wife, Melinda
S. Kramer, for their assistance with the research and editing ofthis article. Mr. Kramer can be contacted
at davidkramer@verizon.net.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)).
2
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any
securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (2004). For a more detailed discussion of how this statute relates to the
subject matter of the instant article, see infra Part lI.B. and the accompanying foomotes.
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buying or selling a security. 3 Over the past seventy years since the
enactment of the Exchange Act, no court has ever visited the issue of
whether distinctions should be drawn between the classifications of
individuals who provide false and misleading information to the market and
the subsequent punishment that they receive. The most probable
explanation for this judicial silence is the unambiguous language of the law
that uniformly applies equally to anyone who violates it. Nonetheless, people
ranging from high ranking Wall Street analysts to high school students have
seen (and later realized) the potential to make immense profits in the market
by manipulating the price of various securities that they own.
Since the inception of the securities markets, there has been an element
of unsavory individuals who unlawfully use or fabricate information to their
own financial advantage. One of the first and most infamous securities
frauds involved Charles Ponzi.4 Mr. Ponzi devised a scheme whereby he
borrowed money from various investors who believed that he was using the
money to purchase stamps in foreign countries that he later claimed to sell
elsewhere for a substantial profit.5 In exchange for capital that allegedly
enabled him to purchase more stamps, Ponzi issued his investors short term
notes (securities) that promised a 50% return. 6 In reality, Ponzi was making
no such investments and merely paid off one investor with another
investor's money.7 When Ponzi was unable to find enough new investors
3

See I. Meyer Pincus & Assoc., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entre't, Inc., 900 F.2d 576,581 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Luce
v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986)).
4
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
5
Id.
In December, 1919, with a capital of $150, [Ponzi] began the business of borrowing money
on ... promissory notes [that he wrote]. ... [Ponzi] spread the false tale that on his own
account he was engaged in buying international postal coupons in foreign countries and
selling them in other countries at 1001%] profit, and that this was made possible by the
excessive differences in the rates of exchange following the war. He was willing ... to give
others the opportunity to share with him this profit. By a written promise in [ninety] days
to pay them $150 for every $100 loaned, he induced thousands to lend him [money]. He
stimulated their avidity by paying his [ninety]-day notes in full at the end of [forty-five] days,
and by circulating the notice that he would pay any unmatured note presented in less than
[forty-five] days at 1001%] of the loan. Within eight months he took in $9,582,000 for which
he issued his notes for $14,374,000. He paid his agents a commission of 10[%]. With the
50[%] promised to lenders, every loan paid in full with the profit would cost him 60[%]. He
was always insolvent and became daily more so, the more his business succeeded. He made
no investments of any kind, so that all the money he had at any time was solely the result of
loans by his dupes.
Id. at 7-8.
6

Id.

7

Id.
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to support the payments on maturing notes already issued to older investors,
his scheme collapsed and he was left with no choice but to file for
bankruptcy.'
In more recent years, a common securities fraud that has been
perpetrated countless times with resounding financial success is a scheme
known as a "pump and dump." The scheme itself is quite simple. The
person carrying out the fraud first targets a publicly traded company that is
generally small in size and thinly traded on either the Over The Counter
Bulletin Board or the NASDAQ market and then purchases large quantities
of this stock. After obtaining a sizeable position in the chosen stock, the
perpetrator then launches a large scale campaign to disseminate as much
false and misleading information about the company as possible to effectuate
the desired result.
In a "pump and dump" scheme, the perpetrator generally touts9
("pumps") a stock by making baseless projections about its future share price
and/or unjustified forecasts about the company's future earnings. To
enhance the legitimacy of their claims, the perpetrator often alludes to
fictitious contracts or non-existent merger talks.' 0 With the exponential
growth in the number of people using the internet over the past decade, the
World Wide Web has become the most popular medium for the perpetrator
to communicate with the investing public. As the market digests the false
and misleading information, the share price of the targeted company usually
moves dramatically in the direction intended by the scheme's architect.
When the perpetrator believes that the market has reached the ceiling (or
floor) based on the false and misleading information that he supplied, the
perpetrator sells ("dumps") their entire position and realizes a substantial
gain.' In the hours and days after the scheme's initiation, the share price of
the targeted stock almost always returns to within pennies of the price that

Id. at 8-9.
To "tout" is to "[a]ggressively promote a particular security. Usually done by someone with
a vested interest in seeing the stock's price rise, such as a company employee, public relations firm,
analyst, or large shareholder. Illegal in certain circumstances." WebFinance, Inc., investorwords.com, at
http://www.investorwords.cor/5009/tout.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
10
Some "pump and dump" schemes work in reverse, whereby the perpetrator makes negative
comments about a company that are untrue. In these cases, the perpetrator intends to drive down the
share price of the targeted company so that they can either sell their shares short or create a buying
opportunity knowing that the stock will later rebound once the market has cleansed itself of the false
information.
11
In a typical "pump and dump scheme," the perpetrators buy and sell transactions in the
targeted stock are opposite those of the investing public. Thus, the perpetrator generally either sells his
position while others are buying the targeted security and driving up the share price or buys his position
while others are selling and driving down the share price.
8

9

246 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:243
it was before the perpetrator made false and misleading statements about it
because the market has cleansed itself of the erroneous information.
"Pump and dump" schemes, which are most often perpetrated over the
internet, are simply a variety of illegal market manipulation. Internet
securities frauds, however, fall within one of three general categories.' 2 In
addition to market manipulation schemes, securities frauds also include
offering frauds and illegal touting. 13An offering fraud "involves perpetrators
creating sophisticated web sites and/or mass emails offering securities that
either do not exist or are misleading. 1 4 Illegal touting occurs when newsletters, web sites, or email publications, which appear to be independent to
the internet user, accept payment for favorably reporting upon a stock.'5
often comes in the form of stock
The payment to the internet promoter
6
touted.'
being
company
from the
This article will focus on market manipulation frauds by examining five
recent "pump and dump" schemes that were orchestrated by individuals
ranging from the manager of the world's largest mutual fund to a fifteenyear-old high school student.'" All five schemes were designed and then
executed with resounding financial success. Although the law is presently
designed to treat each of these "pump and dump" perpetrators identically,
this article will question the utility and necessity in doing so.
In addressing the scrutiny that should be applied to individuals who
disseminate false and misleading or omitted information about securities
with the intent to induce others into buying or selling them, this article will
propose a three-tiered analysis to determine whether liability should apply.
Although this analysis is primarily targeted at offering a discretionary guide
to the SEC and the manipulation cases that it brings through its Division of
Enforcement, its utility as a legal doctrine has the potential to be wide
reaching by serving as a bar to private civil suits brought by aggrieved
plaintiffs. The vast majority of securities manipulation scheme cases are pre12

Constance Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in Cyberspace: Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal

Securities Laws, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 927 (2001); see also Byron D. Hittle, An Uphill Battle: The Dffculty
165, 169 (Dec. 2001).
of Deterring and Detecting Perpetratorsof Internet Stock Fraud,54 FED.COMM. L.J.
Wagner, supra note 12, at 927.
13
14
Hittle, supra note 12, at 169-170 ("The subject matter of [sham] offerings tends to be exotic,
offering interests in, for example, eel farms, coconut plantations, and projects to explore near earth
asteroids. With the availability of advanced, yet inexpensive, software, fraudsters can design web sites
that present the facade of a legitimate investment opportunity.").
Is

Id.

16

Id.

17

As discussed in detail below, some "pump and dump" schemes are built upon an illegal

touting scheme. See infra Part I.B. and the accompanying footnotes. Nonetheless, unless otherwise
indicated, the use of the word "fraud" in this article refers to a market manipulation variety of securities
fraud.
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sently brought by the SEC as opposed to private litigants because demonstrating actual damages can be difficult, individual losses are often extremely
small, and recovery against the perpetrator is nearly impossible.'" The SEC
brings manipulation cases, however, because the fraudsters often make
substantial profits and their failure to bring such cases would result in
extensive public criticism that the Commission was failing to perform its
regulatory duty. Accordingly, if the standards for imposing liability for
securities manipulation schemes were changed pursuant to §10(b) and Rule
10b-5 thereunder, the SEC could focus its attention to more pressing
matters that stand a greater chance of having a favorable outcome' 9 and the
investing pubic would be forced to be more diligent with its investing
decisions20because the SEC would no longer be working to protect them in
this area.

As this article establishes, courts should first look at the materiality of the
statement. If the statement is not material, liability should not be imposed.
While the question of materiality is and has always been a defense to making
false and misleading statements about a security, this article will deviate from
the traditional analysis by proposing two additional steps in the analytical
process.
Where a statement is found to be material, courts should next determine
whether the speaker is an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940.21 When an investment adviser makes materially false and
misleading statements about a security, liability should be imposed. Where
materially false and misleading statements are made by someone who is not
an investment adviser, however, courts should then consider a third step
consisting of a number of additional factors, no single one being dispositive,
for determining liability. Some of these factors include the size of the
company being discussed and its share price, the quantity of presumably
accurate information that the company has made available to the market, the

1s

For a discussion of private securities litigation and the merits of such claims, see generally

Charles M. Yablon,A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claimsand Private SecuritiesLitigation, 94 NW. U.L.
REV. 567 (Winter 2000). Furthermore, establishing a plaintiff's reliance on the misstatement or fraud can
be difficult. See generally Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulationand CorporateControl Transactions,
40 U. MIAm L. REv. 671, n.273 (March 1986) (discussing various conclusions by numerous Courts of
Appeals relating to the "Fraud on the Market" theory's effect on investor reliance).
19
For example, the ongoing investigations into Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and mutual fund late
trading.
20
In the five manipulation cases discussed below, this article will suggest that only one case,
DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), warrants SEC prosecution due
to the egregious nature of the fraud.
21
See generally 15 U.S.C. 80(b) (2004). For a complete discussion of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 as it relates to this article, see infra Part III.B. and the accompanying footnotes.
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medium for the perpetrator's false and misleading communications with the
investing public, and the speaker's reputation and track record as an analyst.
In cases where the perpetrator has little or no record as an analyst and makes
baseless projections about little known companies over the internet, this
article will argue that the principles of caveat emptor should govern and
liability should not be imposed on the supposed fraudster.
II. THE PERPETRATORS OF RECENT "PUMP AND DuMP" SCHEMES
RANGE FROM HIGH-LEVEL MARKET ANALYSTS TO UNKNOWN
TEENAGERS.

A. Analysts At Well-Known And Highly Respected BrokerageFirms Are Not
Immune From The Temptation To Engage In Pump And Dump Schemes. One
Way That Such Individuals Can Make SubstantialProfits Is To Issue A Public
Buy Recommendation ForA Stock That They Are Concurrently Selling In Their
Own PersonalAccounts: DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, Inc.22
DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, Inc. is the most recent case to address an
analyst's liability for perpetrating a pump and dump scheme on a stock that
he covered. The facts relevant to this matter began in the 1990s when
Robertson Stephens, Inc. ("Robertson Stephens"), 3 created three limited
partnerships known as the Bayview Partnerships for the purpose of investing
in companies prior to their initial public offering of stock.24 The Bayview
Partnerships purchased approximately $5 million dollars worth of Corvis
stock in November of 1999 upon the recommendation of Defendant Paul
Johnson, who was at the time a managing director and senior equity analyst
with Robertson Stephens.25 Prior to the public offering, Johnson invested
his own personal funds in the Bayview Partnerships and also invested in a
26
separate venture capital fund that purchased Corvis shares.
Corvis conducted its initial public offering of stock on July 27, 2000 at
$36 per share.27 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs allege thatJohnson engaged
in a scheme to manipulate the price of Corvis stock by publishing false and
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
Robertson Stephens is a nationally renowned broker-dealer that also engages in various
financial services. Specifically, Robert Stephens participates in securities underwriting efforts, investment
banking, and equity analysis. Id. at 114.
22
23

24

Id.

25

Id. Corvis manufactures optical networking equipment. Id.
Id. "[The] Corvis shares [that] were privately issued prior to the Corvis initial public offering

26

("pre-IPO [stock]") ... [were] subject to a "lock-up" restriction that prevented the purchaser from
selling the stock for 180 days after the initial public offering." Id. at 115.
27

Id.
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misleading statements of opinion about the company in its research
reports.28 On January 23, 2001, following three separate public "buy"
recommendations by Robertson Stephens in a six month period following
Corvis's initial public offering, 29 Johnson informed the Bayview investment
committee that he would purchase the Corvis stock at a price of $12-14 per
share. 3' The next day, which was the earliest point at which the defendants
were allowed to sell their Corvis stock, Johnson sold 6,550 of his 8,175
personal shares and Robertson Stephens sold the shares that it held through
the Bayview Partnerships. 31 On January 26, 2001,just one day after Corvis
reported a loss of $89.7 million, Robertson Stephens issued a fourth public
"buy" recommendation for Corvis as it closed at $20.50 per share.32 Three
days later, onJanuary 29, 2001,Johnson sold additional shares of Corvis that
he personally held, and the stock closed at $19.43 per share.33 Finally, on
April 27, 2001, Robertson Stephens published a fifth and final report on
Corvis stock, which once again recommended that investors purchase the
stock.34
The reports written by Johnson concerning the Corvis stock did not
provide the investors with the information that Robertson Stephens had
already sold off the majority of their Corvis holdings.35 On May 27, 2001,
the New York Times ran an article reporting that Johnson and other
executives at Robertson Stephens had been selling Corvis stock while
advising the public to purchase it. 36 The plaintiffs then filed suit on January
27,2003 alleging that the defendants attempted to artificially inflate the share
price of Corvis stock until they could sell their own pre-IPO shares by

28

Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 115.

29

Robertson Stephens issued its first report on Corvis on August 22, 2000. At that time,

Robertson Stephens issued a "buy" recommendation when the closing price that day was $90.81 per
share. On October 20, 2000, Robertson Stephens issued a second report on Corvis which again
contained a "buy" recommendation. The closing price for Corvis stock on that day was $67.13 per share,

an increase from the day's opening price of $59.61 per share. Robertson Stephens then issued a third
report on Corvis onJanuary 16, 2001 when the share price closed at $23.94. Like the two earlier reports,
this report also contained a "buy" recommendation for Corvis. Id.

30

Id. Johnson's comment essentially advised the Bayview investment committee against buying

Corvis stock at the then market price of approximately $24.50 per share. Id.
31
Id. Corvis stock closed on January 24, 2001 at $23.06 per share. Id.
32

Id.

33

Id.

Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
Id. ("However, on January 29, 2001, Johnson filed a Form 144 statement with the SEC
disclosing hisJanuary 24th sale of 6,550 shares [of Corvis stock].").
34

35

36

Id.
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encouraging investors to purchase Corvis stock even though they believed
38
it to be overvalued. 37 The defendants then moved to dismiss.
Stating the legal standards of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
thereunder,39 the court outlined the heightened pleading standards that are
applicable to securities fraud cases under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").40 Under the PSLRA, complaints alleging
securities fraud must first, "specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed," 4' and second, "with respect to each act or omission alleged
., state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the

37
Id. at 115. The defendants responded "that trading in Corvis stock was always volatile, that
the plaintiffs did not read or rely on [Robertson Stephens] reports, and that the market's overall
disenchantment with telecommunications stock was the intervening cause responsible for plaintiffs'
losses." Id. at 115-116.
38
Id. On a motion to dismiss, "[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading ...shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion ... failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[T]he Court must accept as true all wellpleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 116. (quoting Leeds
v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996)). "The Court will not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffcan prove no set of facts in support of his claim
thatwould entitle him to relief.'" Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (citing Conleyv. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Beyond the facts in the complaint, the court may consider "any written
instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference."
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d
42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)). While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally require only notice
pleading, where, as here, the plaintiff alleges fraud, "the circumstances constituting fraud ...
shall be
stated with particularity." Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). See
Stem v. General. Electric Co., 924 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir. 1991)) ("Allegations of fraud must be
supported by particular statements indicating the factual circumstances on which the theory of fraud is
based"). "Rule 9(b) is designed to further three goals: (1) providing a defendant fair notice ofplaintiffs
claim, to enable preparation of defense; (2) protecting a defendant from harm to his reputation or
goodwill; and (3) reducing the number of strike suits." Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 116
(quoting DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987)).
39
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 116. See also 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5; SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d. Cir. 1968) (explaining that the SEC "promulgated [Rule 10b-51 pursuant
to the grant of authority given the SEC by Congress in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934," by which Congress sought "to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in
securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges.").
40
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 116-117.
41

Id.
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defendant acted with the required state of mind,"'42 which under 510(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder is scienter.43
In their defense, Robertson Stephens and Johnson offered a number of
arguments why the plaintiffs failed to meet the heightened pleading standard
required by the PSLRA. First, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs did
not allege facts demonstrating that Robertson Stephens or Johnson had
misrepresented their opinion that investors should purchase Corvis stock in
any of the reports that they publicly released (other than the January 26,
2001 report).44 Rejecting this argument, the court stated that there was little
doubt that the statements made by the defendants in their reports dated
January 16 and 26, 2001 misrepresented their true belief about the investment quality of Corvis stock.45 In support of this conclusion, the court
noted that, "[a] one-week or three-day lag between public statements
advising purchase and an internal statement essentially advising sale supports
the inference that defendants actually believed the stock was overvalued on
January 16 and 26, when they publicly recommended that investors purchase
the stock."46 The court also pointed to the fact that the defendants sold their
Corvis stock at the earliest possible time, which was contrary to the advice
to purchase Corvis stock publicly provided by the defendants.47 Moreover,
the court noted that the earlier buy recommendations were made at a time
when the defendants had a motive to keep the price of Corvis stock inflated
because it was during the lock-up period when they were unable to sell their
48
shares.

The defendants next argued that even if the published reports
misrepresented their opinion about Corvis stock, such statements were not
material. 49 Stating the steadfast rule on materiality, the court noted that,
"[t]o be material, the information need not be such that a reasonable
investor would necessarily change his investment decision based on the
information, as long as a reasonable investor would have viewed it as

Id.
Id. at 117. See also 15 U.S.C. S78u-4(b)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,193 n.12 (1976); Kalnitv. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131,138 (2d. Cir. 2001) (quoting
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300,310 (2d Cir. 2000) and stating that the PSLRA "did not change the basic
pleading standard for scienter in this circuit."). Both before and after the PSLRA, the law required
plaintiffs bringing claims under §10(b) ofthe Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, to allege scienter
with particularity. Id.
44
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
42

43

45

Id.

46

Id at 118.

47

Id.
Id.
Id.

48
49
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significantly altering the 'total mix' of information available." 0 The court,
therefore, concluded that, "Robertson Stephens was in the business of
speaking to the market about stock values, it chose to speak about Corvis,
and it is entirely reasonable that investors would consider analyst
recommendations as part of the 'total mix' of information available when
making purchases."'" Accordingly, the court concluded that the facts as
alleged in the complaint, if proved, were "amply sufficient to permit a
reasonable 2 factfinder to conclude that the misrepresentations were
5
material.
Addressing the scienter element of the defendants' actions, the court
stated that, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a S10(b) complaint must allege
facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent by alleging either
'(a) ...
facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to
commit fraud, or (b) ...
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence
of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.' 5 3 Here, the plaintiffs alleged
scienter under either standard.54 First, the defendants had both a motive and
an opportunity to commit fraud."5 Second, the complaint alleged facts about
the opinionsJohnson expressed to the Bayview Partnerships' investors at the
January 23, 2001 meeting, which provided direct evidence that the
defendants consciously misrepresented their opinion about the true value of
Corvis stock in the reports that they issued. 6
Finally, the court addressed the defendants' claim that there was no
causal link between their actions and the plaintiffs' alleged injuries.5 7 The
court noted that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must
allege "that the violations in question caused the plaintiff to engage in the

so

Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438,

449 (1976)).
s1

Id. at 118.

52

Id.

53

Id. (citing Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995)).

S4

Id.

55

Id. at 118-119. The defendants had a motive to keep the price of Corvis stock inflated until
after they were able to sell their pre-IPO shares. As a means to perpetrate their fraud, the defendants
utilized the research reports that they issued to publicly encourage investors to purchase Corvis stock
at a time when they privately believed that it was overvalued. Id.
56
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
57
Id. See also Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534 (2d. Cir. 1999). This causation
requirement has two elements: "a plaintiff must allege both transaction causation, i.e., that but for the
fraudulent statement or omission, the plaintiffwould not have entered into the transaction; and loss
causation, i.e., that the subject of the fraudulent statement or omission was the cause of the actual loss
suffered." Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (quoting Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. TorontoDominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis removed from original)).
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transaction in question. ' 8 Under the holding in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,59
individual investors need not show direct reliance on the fraudulent statement because "it is assumed that in an efficient market, all public information is reflected in [a] share price, including any misrepresentations concerning the value of the company or its stock." 6° Thus, "it is sufficient that
[the investor] bases her transaction on the market trends or securities prices
that are altered by the fraud."'" The court espoused that an underwriter like
Robertson Stephens clearly intends for the market to take its analysis about
a given company into account as evidenced by the fact that it has a research
department engaged in the business of analyzing companies for the primary
purpose of publicly disseminating such information.6 2 The court, therefore,
concluded that, "[i] t is axiomatic that prices in an open market reflect supply
and demand, and it is disingenuous, to say the least, for defendants to now
argue that their published purchase recommendations are somehow
excluded from the information available to market actors when valuing
securities."63
To counter the previously addressed "Fraud on the Market Theory"
relied upon by the plaintiffs, the defendants raised the "Truth on the
Market" defense. 64 The defendants claimed that "Robert Stephens

58

Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (citing Grace v. Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40,45 (2d Cir.

2000)). Although the plaintiffs fail to allege that they ever read or even saw a Robertson Stephens report
that is not fatal to their claim because the plaintiffs' allegation of
on Corvis stock prior to purchasing it,
transaction causation relies on the "Fraud on the Market Theory." Id. The "'Fraud on the Market
Theory' [is] based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market the price of a
company's stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do
business ...
not directly rely on the misstatements." Id. (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988)
(internal citations omitted)). The court noted that, "[t]his theory of transaction causation takes into
account the difference between face-to-face negotiated transactions contemplated by traditional
common-law fraud doctrines, and modern securities markets where multiple sellers and buyers engage
in transactions at prices determined by an impersonal market, while remaining mutually anonymous."
Id. (internal citations omitted). The presumption of reliance may be rebutted by "any showing that
severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and ... the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff,
because in that case the basis for finding that the fraud had been transmitted through market price would
be gone." Id. at 120 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
60
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
61
Id. (citing In re Initial Public Offerings Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281,375 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
62

Id. at 120.

63

Id.
Id. at 121. To establish the "Truth on the Market" defense, the defendants must show that
the public received accurate, "corrective information" from an alternative source "with a degree of
64

intensity and credibility sufficient to counter-balance effectively any misleading impression created by
the alleged misstatements." Id. (quoting Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F. 3d 154, 167 (2d Cir.
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repeatedly disclosed that it might own stock in Corvis and provided
investment banking services to Corvis, and the Corvis prospectus indicated
that the defendants owned pre-IPO shares." 65 To bolster their "Truth on
the Market" defense, the defendants argued that the market was aware of the
conflicting role of sell side analysts from extensive media coverage.66 The
court dismissed this argument and concluded that it was unlikely that
general market concerns about analysts' conflicts would "have sufficiently
apprised the market ofthis specific scheme to dupe investors into purchasing
securities that defendants allegedly believed to be greatly overvalued so that
defendants could sell their personal shares at an artificial profit."67 In
addition, the court found that regardless ofwhat information the defendants
disclosed and the press revealed about potential analysts' conflicts, the fact
remains that Johnson's privately held views of Corvis stock were not a
matter of public record.68
Finally, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet the loss
causation requirement because a complaint must do more than allege that
the misrepresentations caused a discrepancy between the transaction price
and the actual value of the stock. 69 The defendants contended that the
plaintiffs must allege that their loss is a direct consequence of the misrepresentation 70 and opined that the plaintiffs' losses were actually attributable

2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). "As the Second Circuit has noted, 'the truth
on the market defense is intensely fact-specific and is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a §10(b)
complaint for failure to plead materiality.'" Id.
65
Id. The court also suggests that the submission ofJohnson's Form 144 to the SEC, which
disclosed the sale of his Corvis stock, could be used to support the defendants' "Truth on the Market"
defense. Id.
66
Id. For example, "[o]n Sunday, May 27,2001, the New York Times ran an article reporting
that Johnson and other executives at Robertson Stephens had been selling Corvis stock while advising
the public to purchase the stock. The article did not reveal that Johnson had advised the Bayview
committee to sell its shares." Id. (citing Gretchen Morgenson, Buy, They Say. But What Do They Do?;
I.P.O. Conflicts Bedevil Analysts, NEWYORK TIMES, May 27, 2000, Sec. 3, p. 1).
67
Id. at 122.
68

Id.

69

Id. The Second Circuit has "'likened loss causation to the tort concept of proximate cause,

because, similar to proximate cause, in order to establish loss causation, a plaintiffmust prove that the
damage suffered was a foreseeable consequence of the misrepresentation."' Id. (quoting Citibank, N.A.
v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1992)). But seeAUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst and Young, 206
F.3d 202, 233 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that "the pertinent requirements of proximate cause in a statutory
case are those intended by the legislature" and warning that courts not "overwork the analogy between
proximate cause in common law negligence and proximate cause in federal securities law violations")
(internal citations and punctuation omitted). If the loss was caused by an intervening event not related
to the fraud, then the §10(b) claim must fail. Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 122 (citing Suez
Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96 (2001)).
70
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 122. See Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt, LLC v. Stonepath
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to a general downturn in the telecommunications market."1 Dismissing this
theory, the court stated that "the publication of the intentionally false
opinions that allegedly distorted the market price of Corvis stock contained
the seeds of loss causation. Unless an intervening event were to occur first,
the author of the false opinion will be appropriately held responsible when
the market eventually corrects the artificially inflated price.... 7 2
The defendants' primary argument against loss causation in Robertson
Stephens was that "the 'Fraud on the Market Theory' should apply only to
transaction causation and never to loss causation under any circumstance."73
However, the court astutely observed that, "it is unlikely that loss causation
could be adequately alleged in every fraud-on-the-market case that success-

Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003) (an "allegation ofa purchase-time value disparity, standing
alone, cannot satisfy the loss causation pleading requirement"). "It is not enough to claim that the price
was artificially inflated when plaintiffs purchased the stock, because if some event not related to the
misrepresentation caused the loss, then there is no S10(b) liability." Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d
at 122. "To establish loss causation, in other words, plaintiffs 'must also show that the misstatements
were the reason the transaction turned out to be a losing one.'" Id. (citing First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt
Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1994)).
71
Id. at 123. The defendants interpret the "bursting of the telecommunications stock bubble"
as the intervening cause of the plaintiffs' alleged loss. Id.
72

Id.

Id. at 124. The Second Circuit has not addressed whether, in the context of a class action
relying on a "Fraud on the Market Theory," the plaintiffs sufficiently plead loss causation by alleging that
they purchased at an inflated price created by the misrepresentations, and the price declined as the
market corrected the distortion. Id. There is a division of authority on the subject. Id. The Ninth
Circuit has rejected defendants' position, holding in Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney that "in a fraud-on-themarket case, plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date of purchase
was inflated because of the misrepresentation." Id. (citing 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996)). Other
circuits have also found that loss causation was adequately pled in fraud-on-the-market cases where
defendants' misrepresentations led to an artificially altered stock price, which was followed by a market
correction. Id. (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 184 (3d Cir. 2000) ("where the
claimed loss involves the purchase of a security at a price that is inflated due to an alleged
misrepresentation, there is a sufficient causal nexus between the loss and the alleged misrepresentation
to satisfy the loss causation requirement"); In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 619 (8th
Cir. 1991)). Opinions of the Second Circuit have also followed Knapp. Id. (citing In re Initial Pub.
Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 377, note 145 (2003); Fellman v. Electro Optical Systems
Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). Defendants find support for their position,
however, in the Eleventh Circuit, and The United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew
York's recent decision in Merrill Lynch. Id. (citing Robbins v. Koger Props., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th
Cit. 1997) ("the fraud on the market theory, as articulated by the Supreme Court, is used to support a
rebuttable presumption ofreliance, not a presumption ofcausation"); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research
Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying Robbins and reasoning that "to
permit plaintiffs to allege artificial inflation through the fraud on the market theory to satisfy loss
causation would improperly conflate both the 'but for' transaction causation and the loss causation
elements into one.")).
73
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fully pleads transaction causation because in cases where an unforeseeable
intervening event causes the plaintiffs' loss, there is no causal nexus between
the loss and the misrepresentation. 7 4 In denying the defendants' motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' claim that Robert Stephens and Johnson engaged in a
scheme to defraud or manipulate the stock price of Corvis, the court
concluded that, "[the] plaintiffs have adequately alleged loss causation
because the decline in stock price was a foreseeable consequence of [the]
defendants' fraudulent statements that allegedly inflated the price, because
in an efficient market, revelation
of the misrepresentations will lead
75
inexorably to a price correction.
B. ClassicInternet Pump And Dump Schemes Committed By Greedy
Analysts /ho Made Big ProfitsBy Manipulating The Market In Penny And
Small CapitalizationStocks: SEC v. Huttoe. 6
SEC v. Huttoe is one of, if not the first, case brought by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") against individuals who
distributed false and misleading information through the internet about
stocks that they owned as part of a scheme to artificially inflate the share
price of those companies by encouraging others to buy them. 77 Shannon
Terry, age 28, was an independent contractor employed by SGA Goldstar
Research, Inc. ("SGA") from August, 1993 until November, 1996.78 The
SGA Goldstar Whisper Stocks newsletter, also known as, the 'Whisper
Newsletter,' was published by SGA.v9 Moreover, the only shareholder of
SGA stock, Theodore Melcher, served as the editor and publisher of the
Whisper Newsletter. 0 SGA's business was conducted out of Melcher's

74
Id. at 125 (emphasis in original). In First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., the court
stated, however, that it did not "mean to suggest that in all cases a fraud plaintiffwill be unable to plead
proximate causation when the claim follows a market collapse." 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir. 1994).
75
Robertson Stephens, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 125.
76
SEC v. Huttoe, No. 96-2543GK, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998).
77
The SEC brought charges against named Defendant Charles 0. Huttoe, Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of Systems of Excellence, Inc. ("SOE") for fraud in connection with
the registration and sale of SOE common stock. Id. at *4-5. A final judgment was entered, under seal,
against Huttoe in November, 1997. Id. at *5, n.2. The instant opinion only relates to Defendants
Shannon Terry and Dunbar Holdings, and Relief Defendant J.S. Holdings. Id. at *5.
78
Id. at *6.
79
Id. Whisper Newsletter charged its subscribers a subscription fee. Id. at *7.
80
Id. at *6. SGA Goldstar Research, Inc. and Theodore Melcher were also named defendants
in the original SEC complaint against Charles Huttoe. Id. at *6, n.3.
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home, and it is important to note that for most of Terry's tenure only he and
Melcher were working at SGA.8"
The Whisper Newsletter profiled "high risk aggressive growth" companies that were either "largely unknown and untested penny stocks or small
capitalization companies. 8 2 Every night SGA subscribers received the
Whisper Newsletter by facsimile or download from SGA's web page. 83 As
many as half of the articles published in the Whisper newsletter were written
by Terry, who also handled many of SGA's administrative tasks. 84 For his
work, Terry received a base compensation and a share of all subscription
revenue. 5 In addition, companies paid SGA with company stock in
exchange for articles promoting their stock in the Whisper Newsletter. 6
SGA would in turn give Terry stock in the companies that he promoted in
the articles he wrote. 87 Terry's trading in these stocks either coincided with
the publication of articles about these stocks in the Whisper Newsletter or
took place shortly thereafter.88 Although Terry's articles recommended that
readers buy stock in the companies being promoted, he would often turn
around and sell his position in the recommended stock within a few days of
publication. 9 Not surprisingly, the price of the featured stocks generally
rose soon after the Whisper Newsletter made strong buy recommendations
to its subscribers, and Terry was able to realize substantial profits for
himself.'
The SEC brought an action against Terry alleging that he violated
10(b) 91 of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 92 thereunder. This action was
based on the facts and circumstances suggesting that Terry had: "(1) touted

81
82
83

Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *6.
Hutoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *6-7.
Id. at *7. In 1996, there were approximately 280 subscribers to the Whisper Newsletter. In
addition to receiving compensation from its subscribers, SGA also obtained revenue through the
companies that it publicized. Id.
84
Id. at *7-8.
85
Id. at *8. Terry's base compensation was $25,000 plus 12.5% of all new and renewal
subscription revenue. Id.
86

Id.

87

Id. Although the stock was not given to Terry directly by the companies that he covered in
his articles for the Whisper Newsletter, it came from the issuing company to SGA and then was passed
on by SGA to Terry. Id. Between October,1994 and September,1996, Terry received stock in eighteen
companies that were later promoted in the Whisper Newsletter. Id. The value of the stocks that he
received from his allegedly illegal activities was $828,448. Id.
ss
Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *9.

89

Id. at *10-11.

90

Id. at *11.

91
92

See supra note 2 for the complete text of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
For the relevant text of Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, see supra note 39.
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publicly traded securities to potential investors in articles he wrote for the
Whisper Newsletter in return for undisclosed compensation from the
issuers of those securities; (2) traded his personal share holdings in stocks
even as he was writing articles in the Whisper Newsletter recommending
their purchase; and (3) failed to disclose either of these practices when he
solicited subscriptions to the Whisper Newsletter." 93 The SEC then moved
for summary judgment of all charges.94
Under Rule 1Ob-5, "it is a fraud for any person to make any statement in
connection with a securities transaction that is materially false or
misleading." 95 A statement is deemed to have been made "in connection
with the sale of any security whenever it may be reasonably expected that a
publicly disseminated document will cause reasonable investors to buy or
sell securities in reliance thereon, regardless of the motive or existence of
contemporaneous transactions by or on behalf of the violator." 96 A
statement is materially misleading "if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider an omitted fact significant in making his
or her investment decision. 97 As previously discussed, "a material
93
Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *13-14. The SEC also alleged Terry committed
violations of §17(a) of the Securities Act which is an anti-fraud provision. Id. at *13. A discussion of
these charges is not germane to the subject matter of this article.
94
Id. at *12-13. Rule 56(b)-(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the standard of
review for a motion for summary judgment. The rule provides in relevant part that, "[a] party against
whom a claim ...
is asserted ...
may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof. ...
The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Huttoe Court also noted that, "[t]he party
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of
material fact." Id. at *12 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). In determining
whether the movant has met this burden, a court must consider all factual inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
Once the moving party makes its initial showing, however, the nonmoving party must demonstrate
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;
McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1135). Moreover, "in determining a motion for summary judgment, the court
may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless
such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion." Id. at
*12-13 (quoting Local Rule 108(h)).
95
Id. at *15. See supra note 39 for the relevant text of Rule lOb-5.
9
Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXS 23211, at *16. See also SEC v. Savoy Industries, Inc., 587 F.2d
1149, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
97
Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *16. See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
232 (1988) (holding that an omitted fact is material if a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in making their vote and this standard should be applied to all § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions.
The Court also held that materiality requires a case by case review of the facts, and a rebuttable
presumption exists that stockholders relied on available information when buying or selling securities).
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misstatement violates §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 when
''g
made with scienter.... 9
In its analysis, the court noted that Terry's receipt of stock in exchange
for writing articles appearing in the Whisper newsletter was "'material' so
long as there [was] a 'substantial likelihood' that a reasonable investor would
consider the motivations of the person recommending the purchase of a
stock a significant factor in making an investment decision." 99 Furthermore,
the "[s]uppression of information material to an evaluation of the disinterestedness of investment advice operate[s] as a deceit on purchasers."1'0
Therefore, the court concluded that "the paid promotional nature of the
articles was clearly a material
fact for subscribers of the Newsletter who were
10 1
potential investors.'
Terry did not argue that the stock compensation that he and Melcher
received was not a "material" fact requiring disclosure. 2 Rather, he claimed
that his compensation was disclosed to subscribers in the Whisper
Newsletter.'0 3 The court stated that the issue to be resolved was "whether
the statements that SGA personnel (1) 'may own shares' in stock featured in
the Whisper Newsletter and (2) 'may act as' paid consultants for issuers of
stock featured in the Newsletter are, separately or together, equivalent to a
disclosure that Terry and Melcher were paid with stock by issuers to
promote that very same stock." 1° 4 Concluding that the statements were not
equivalent, the court found that Whisper Newsletter's disclaimer that
98

Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *16-17. See supra text accompanying note 42 for a

definition of scienter.
99 Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *19. See also Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.
too Hutoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *19 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 198 (1963) (internal citations omitted)).
1
102
103

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. The full text of the (amended) disclaimer appearing in the Whisper Newsletter reads as

follows:
SGA Goldstar Research is not an investment adviser! Information contained inSGA Goldstar
is obtained from sources believed to be reliable; however, in certain instances such
information involves rumors or other time sensitive materials which cannot adequately be
verified. SGA makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy or adequacy of the
information and recommendations provided. This material is not deemed as a solicitation
for the purchase or sale of a security or commodity. Use of the information and
recommendations is at the subscriber's sole risk. Personnel associated with SGA may own
shares in the companies mentioned herein or may act as consultants thereto for
compensation. Prudent investors are advised to use mental stop losses to protect their gains
or limit their losses. All stocks priced under $5per share are deemed "penny stocks" and are
extremely risky and speculative!
Id. at *20, n.11.
104 Id. at *20.
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"personnel ...
may own shares" or "provide consulting advice" suggested
that personnel at SGA were unaware of when they had a personal financial
interest in the companies recommended in its newsletter and thus, was
ambiguous.10 5 The impression left by this disclaimer was that Terry and
Melcher were being compensated for writing and publishing and not
consulting. However, in addition to owning shares in the company, both
were actually provided with shares as compensation for promoting the
company in the newsletter. The court, therefore concluded that "[i]t is
inherently misleading to present articles as objective reporting when they are
in fact promotions paid for by the company featured. Whisper Newsletter
subscribers simply could not tell from the disclaimer that Terry was paid to
promote the stocks about which he wrote and, thus, were deprived of
information substantially likely to affect their investment decision. 10 6
Thus, the court found that Terry violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act by
consistently touting stock for over two years, which establishes the requisite
scienter.17 The court also stated that "[t]he ineffectiveness of the Newsletter's disclosure was not merely negligent. These statements were so likely
to mislead subscribers that it was 'either known to the defendant or [was]
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it."""8 Moreover, the
court found that Terry "clearly must have known that a footnote in the
Newsletter could not have adequately alerted subscribers to the fact that he
and Melcher received free stock for promoting the companies they urged
subscribers to buy."'0 9
The court then proceeded to discuss three additional defenses raised by
Terry, all of which were quickly dismissed as being invalid. First, Terry
argued that "the information appearing in the Whisper Newsletter was not
in connection with the offer or sale of securities within the meaning of the
federal securities laws."" 0 In support of his position, Terry pointed to the
disclaimer which read that, "[t] his material is not deemed as a solicitation for
the purchase or sale of a security or commodity."" The court concluded
that in light of the disclaimer, it was clear that the stocks promoted in the
Whisper Newsletter were "designed to provide subscribers with information
that would cause a reasonable investor to buy or sell securities in reliance

108

Id. at *21.
Id. (citations omitted). See supra note 9 for a definition of "tout."
Hunoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *22.
Id. (citing SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42 (1992)).

109

Id.

11o

Id. at *22-23 (emphasis added).

III

Id. at *23.

105
106
107
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thereon."' 1 2 Second, Terry maintained that "he did not commit fraud
because he wrote only some of the articles appearing in the Whisper
Newsletter and because Melcher exercised final editorial control over its
content."" 3 In response, the court simply noted that a fraud committed by
Melcher does not excuse a fraud committed by Terry. 114 Lastly, Terry
argued that he did not commit a fraud because the SEC failed to prove the
inaccuracy of the information contained within the articles that he
authored." 5 On this point, the court espoused that the fraud at issue was
Terry's failure to disclose that some of the articles appearing in the Whisper
Newsletter were paid promotions and concluded that the SEC made its case
in this regard through Terry's own admissions. 1 16 Moreover, assuming
arguendo that every word that Terry wrote was, in fact, true, Terry would still
be in violation of§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder for
failing to disclose the paid promotional nature of the articles that he
published in the Whisper Newsletter." 7
Also at issue was Terry's nondisclosure of sales contrary to the Whisper
Newsletter's buy recommendations. The uncontested facts demonstrate
that Terry received stock as compensation for the companies that he
recommended in the Whisper Newsletter. " 8 In addition, the record showed
that Terry sold the stocks of eighteen different companies shortly after the
Whisper Newsletter made strong buy recommendations to its subscribers
for those very same stocks." 9 The court concluded that Terry's practice of
selling when the Whisper Newsletter recommended buying has long been
recognized as a fraud or deceit. 120 Known as the practice of "scalping," the
112

Id. (quoting SEC v. Savoy Industries, Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

113

Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *23.

114

Id. at *24.

115

Id. The crux of Terry's argument on this point lies in the fact that as ajournalist, he should

be able to rely on the press releases and other sources of information that he relied upon while writing
his articles for the Whisper Newsletter. Specifically, he alleges that any inaccuracies about SOE were the
result of Huttoe's fraud of which he had no knowledge or other basis for suspicion. Id.
116

Id. at *25.

117

Id.

118

Id. at *26.

119
120

Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *26-27.
Id. at *27-28. For example:

In SECv. CapitalGainsResearch Bureau, Inc., the Supreme Court held that "scalping," a known
practice whereby the owner of shares of a security recommends that security for investment
and then immediately sells it at a profit upon the rise in the market price which follows the
recommendation, was a violation of the Investment Advisors Act.
Id. (citing 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963)). "Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act ("IAA") provides in
relevant part that, 'it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser ... to engage in any transaction, practice
or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client."' Id. at
*28 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 580b-6(2)).
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court espoused that scalping is an "extreme departure from the standard of
care." 121 The court also stated that, "[t]o be clear, the fraud lies not in
Terry's practice of selling stocks contrary to Whisper's recommendations,
but in the failure to disclose that practice to potential investors and readers.
The practice reflects on the objectiveness of the investment advice and is
122
therefore material.
Finding that Terry was cognizant of the danger in misleading subscribers
of the Whisper Newsletter, the court noted that he continued to increase the
number of stocks that he recommended and then sold over a two year
period. 123 Moreover, Terry had actual knowledge of his inappropriate
trading activities based on the fact that he attempted to keep his trading
activities secret by trading the stocks that he scalped in the name of a shell
Bahamian corporation that he owned through a Canadian brokerage
account. 124 Again, Terry's assertion that he disclosed the paid promotional
2
nature of the articles was met with a similarly unsuccessful result. 1
In its holding, the court permanently enjoined Terry and the other
defendants from further violations of the securities laws. 126 First, the court
found that Terry's conduct was not isolated, but part of a prolonged pattern
of behavior that persisted for two years. 27 Second, the court noted that the
nature of the fraud was not merely technical because: (1) Terry acted with
In Capital Gains Research, the Supreme Court recognized that this language mirrors that used

in § 17(a) (3) of the Securities Act, which also appears in Rule 1Ob-5(3) under S 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Id. (citing Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 197-98). "While the basis of liability under the IAA results
from the fiduciary relationship between the investment adviser and the advisee, the Supreme Court
understood that Congress intended that both Acts reflect a general proscription against fraudulent or
deceptive practices such as the material nondisclosure involved in scalping." Hutte, 1998 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 23211, at *28.
121
Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *29-30 (quoting SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636,641
(1992)).
122
Id. at *29 (citations omitted).
123
Id. at *30.
124

Id.

125
Id. at*30-35. See supranotes 105-112 and accompanying text for a discussion ofthe disclaimer
and the court's analysis of it.
126 Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *44.
Upon a finding of violation of the securities laws, the court may permanently enjoin the
defendants from further violations. Under the Savoy Industries test, the court considers
whether the defendant's conduct was (1) isolated or part of a pattern, (2) flagrant and
deliberate or merely technical in nature, and (3) whether the defendant's business will present
opportunities to violate the law in the future.
Id. at *44-45 (citing SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also SEC v. First
City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1989). "The determination should focus on the
propensity for future violations based on the totality of the circumstances." Id. at *45 (citing First City
Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 1228).
127 Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *45.
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scienter to deliberately mislead subscribers of the Whisper Newsletter about
the stocks that he scalped; (2) Terry purposefully attempted to conceal his
128
scalping activities; and (3) Terry never acknowledged his misconduct.
Finally, the court determined that Terry's youth, educational experience
related to stock promotions, and the use of a Bahaman holding company to
place his trades support a strong likelihood that Terry is prone to violate the
securities laws again in the future if given an opportunity to do so. 12 9 The
court also ordered Terry to pay
disgorgement of $828,448 in profits realized
30
activities.1
unlawful
from his
C. A Stock Manipulation Scheme Committed By A Mutual Fund Executive
Who Drove Up The Share Price Of One Of His Fund's Largest Holdings To
CreateA Selling Opportunity: In re Fidelity/Micron Securities Litigation.13
In the case of In re Fidelity/Micron Securities Litigation, the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed the issue of
whether the plaintiffs' complaint that the defendants violated §10(b) of the
Exchange Act was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 In their complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants "deceived the investing public ... concerning
[their] intentions to maintain their large holdings of technology stocks in
general, and Micron common stock in particular, when in fact defendants
... intended to [and were] divesting their technology stocks, particularly
Micron stock."' 33 In support of their claim, the plaintiffs point to statements
128
129

Id. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of Terry's defenses.
Huttoe, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEI)S 23211, at *45-46.

130

Id. at *46.

131
132

964 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1997).
Id. at 542. The plaintiffs are investors who purchased Micron Technologies stock ("Micron")
in October and November, 1995. Id at 540. The defendants are FMR Corporation ("FMR Corp."),
Fidelity Management and Research Company ("FMR"), Fidelity Magellan Fund ("Magellan "), and
Jeffrey Vinik, then the portfolio manager ofMagellan. Magellan is the largest mutual fund in the United
States. Its investment portfolio was valued at $53.5 billion on September 30, 1995. FMR is the registered
investment adviser for Magellan. FMR provides Magellan with shareholder and managerial services,
making all of the Fund's trading decisions and handling all of its communications with shareholders and
the public. FMR Corp. is FMR's parent company. Jeffrey Vinik, an employee of FMR, was a Vice
President and the portfolio manager of Magellan from July of 1992 until June 3, 1996. Id. See supra note
38 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of Rule 9(b) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure.
133
Fidelity/Micron,964 F. Supp. at 541(citations omitted). As of August 31, 1995, approximately
5,600 shareholders owned some 200 million shares of Micron common stock. On September 30, 1995,
FMR owned 19,620,445 shares ofMicron stock, or 9.52% ofthe issued and outstanding shares. Magellan
held 11,769,400 ofthese shares, or 5.7% of Micron's publicly traded stock. Micron was Magellan's third
largest holding. In October of 1995, Magellan sold 1.3 million of its Micron shares. In November of
1995, Magellan sold nearly all of its remaining 11.8 million shares of Micron stock. Id.
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made by Jeffrey Vinik, Fidelity's Magellan Fund manager, in the Magellan
Semiannual Report ("Report") that was released on November 9, 1995.134
In an interview appearing in the Report, Vinik attributed Magellan's outperformance of its competitors to its heavy investment in technology
stocks.13 Specifically mentioning Micron, Vinik stated that, "[t]he valuations of semiconductor stocks were quite depressed entering the [six month]
period [preceding September 30, 1995]. Micron Technology is a good
example of these dynamics at work. Its stock price more than doubled
during that period, yet earnings grew so quickly that, in my view, the stock
is still relatively cheap." 136 The plaintiffs alleged that, "Vinik's statements
were intended to deceive investors and the market [into believing], by this
Report, that Micron continued
to be one of the long-term investments
137
favored by Magellan."
On December 1, 1995, The Washington Post published an article
disclosing that Vinik "had been quietly been selling off most of [Magellan's]
shares in [Micron]."138 In addition, the article reported that the pace of the
sell-off had accelerated to coincide with the release of the Report.139 On the
day the article ran, Micron stock dropped from $54.25 per share down to a
closing price of $51.875 per share.140 The plaintiffs also alleged in their

134

Id.

135

Id.
Id. (citations omitted). Vinik also made the following statements in the Report in response

136

to a scripted question:
[Regarding a reported reduction of Magellan's technology portfolio from 42.6% of its total
holdings to 39.9%] This reduction does not represent a change in my long-term view of the
technology sector. My outlook on technology spending in the U.S. and around the world
over the next several years continues to be very positive. My bottom-up analysis of companies with the best earnings prospects and stockvaluations-prices relative to earnings-kept
pointing time and time again to technology companies.... But to reiterate, as I build the fund
on a stock-by-stock basis, I continue to find that the majority of stocks with excellent longterm earning prospects and attractive valuations fall into the technology group ... because the
long-term business and economic elements that have driven the technology sector are
unlikely to change, I anticipate that the fund will remain overweighted in technology relative
to the broad market for the foreseeable future.
[With regard to his investment philosophy] As to questions about the fund's manageabilityor how the fund impacts the overall market-it's important to remember that I invest with
a long-term horizon. I acquire stock positions slowly, over a period of time, and sell positions
slowly, over a period of time, in seeking the maximum value for the fund's shareholders.
Id. at 541, n.4 (citations omitted).
137
Id.
138
Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
139
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 542.
140
Id. This one day decline is most likely attributable to the fact that Micron's share price was
inflated due to the market's erroneous belief that Vinik liked it. See id.

2005]

THE WAY IT IS AND THE WAY IT SHOULD BE

265

complaint that "Vinik's influence on the stock market is second only to that
of the Federal Reserve Chairman.... [W]hen Vinik buys or sells shares, the
market feels the effects, [the] buy-and-sell decisions of Vinik ...
can have a
life-and-death impact on the stock price of many high-tech companies....
141
[E]verybody on the Street is looking to figure out what [Vinik] is doing.'
Addressing the legal standard for its analysis of the defendants' motion
to dismiss, the court stated that "we must accept the allegations of the
complaint as true, and if, under any theory, the allegations are sufficient to
state a cause of action in accordance with the law, we must deny the motion
to dismiss.' ' 142 In addition, the court noted that the complaint must contain
"factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material
element necessary to sustain a recovery under some actionable theory." 43
Therefore, assertions and legal conclusions that are unsupported may be
disregarded by the court. 1"
Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
noted that, "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."1 4 Where
securities fraud is alleged, however, the court stated that the particularity
requirements are even more stringent. 146 In such cases, the court espoused
that, "[g] eneral averments of the defendants' knowledge of material falsity
[of disclosures] will not suffice. Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the
complaint must set forth specific facts that make it reasonable to believe that
defendant[s] knew that a statement was materially false or misleading. The
rule requires that the particular times, dates, places or other
details of the
147
alleged fraudulent involvement of the actors be alleged.'
The court then proceeded to analyze the plaintiffs' allegations in the
context of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 148 The
141
142
143

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Id. (quoting Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 628 (1st Cir. 1996) (further

internal citations omitted)).
144
145

Id. (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st Cir. 1996)).
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 542. For a complete discussion of Rule 9(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
146
Fidelity/Micron,964 F. Supp. at 542.
147
Id. (citing Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357,361 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)). The First Circuit has "been especially rigorous in demanding
such factual support in the securities context, particularly where the possibility exists that plaintiffs are
seeking to use discovery as a settlement device rather than as a tool for marshaling evidence to support
the merits of their claims. For this reason, heightened pleading is required even when the fraud relates
to matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposing party." Id. (quoting Romani v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991)).
144
Id. For the relevant provisions of§10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereundersee
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court first addressed the issue of whether Magellan could be held liable for
statements made by Vinik and the other co-defendants. 149 In doing so, the
court noted that, "[t]o bring a defendant within the ambit of Rule 10b-5,
[the] plaintiffs must allege a misleading or manipulative representation or
omission attributable to that defendant.' ' 150 The plaintiffs advanced three
reasons to justify why Magellan shared primary liability for the other codefendants' false and misleading statements. 15' First, they claimed that when
Vinik spoke, the market understood that he was speaking for Magellan.' 5 2
Second, the plaintiffs argued that some of the false and misleading
statements appeared in the Report." 3 Finally, they asserted that "Magellan
directly benefited from the scheme to manipulate the price of Micron
154

stock.'

In response, Magellan contended that, as an entity, it made no
statements, and that all of the statements about which the plaintiffs
complained fell under the investment management and communications
responsibilities delegated to FMR and Vinik. 155 The plaintiffs acknowledged
supra notes 2 and 39, respectively.
149
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 543.
150
Id. (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)). The issue
in Central Bank of Denver was whether §10(b) covered persons who aid and abet a securities violation.
The Court concluded that the statute prohibits "only the making of a material misstatement (or
omission) or the commission of a manipulative act" and therefore applied only to those who in fact
engage in prohibited conduct, whether "directly or indirectly." Id. (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. at 176-177). "Only primary violators, i.e., those who make a material misstatement or omission or
commit a manipulative act, are subject to private suit under Section 10(b)." In re Kendall Square
Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994).
15i
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 543.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154

Id.

155

Id.

A mutual fund is a "mere shell," a pool of assets consisting mostly of portfolio securities that
belongs to individual investors holding shares in the fund. The management of this asset pool
is largely in the hands of an investment adviser, an independent entity which generally
organizes the fund and provides it with investment advice, management services, and office
space and staff. The adviser either selects or recommends the fund's investments and rate of
portfolio turnover, and operates or supervises most of the other phases of the fund's business.
Id. (quoting Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402,405 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted)). See also Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480-481 (1979) (stating that the principal purpose of the Investment Company
Act [15 U.S.C. §§80a-10(a)-(b), 80a-15(a)-1 5(a)-(c)I is to protect mutual fund investors by maintaining
the fund as an entity independent of its adviser). In the same vein, the Senate Committee overseeing the
passage of the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990 stated:
[T]he Committee also expects that the SEC will not ordinarily seek penalties against
registered investment companies. Generally, an investment company is a managed portfolio
of liquid assets, with all the expenses passed on to shareholders. While the legislation permits
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in their complaint that "Magellan was [is] registered under the Investment
Company Act and that FMR by contractual delegation was [is] responsible
for all of the Fund's trading decisions and communications. ",156 The court
noted that because this responsibility was exclusive to FMR, "Vinik's
statements could only have been made in his capacity as an employee of
FMR" and thus, "statements by Vinik and other FMR employees could not
be imputed to Magellan." 157 However, the plaintiffs argued that Central
Bank s8 does not preclude the liability of a principal for the acts of its
agent. 15 9 In dismissing the §10(b) fraud claim against Magellan, the court
stated that, "[t]o hold Magellan liable under Rule 10b-5 on a theory of
respondeat superior would impose liability without any showing that the
market relied on statements or actions directly or indirectly attributable to
Magellan in evaluating Micron shares."''
The court next addressed liability under a duty to disclose theory.' In
Chiarellav. United States,' 62 the Supreme Court stated that "a duty to disclose
arises when one party has information 'that the other party is entitled to
know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them.""'
The court then noted that in their complaint, the

civil'penalties based on violations of the Investment Company Act, the penalties generally
would be assessed against the responsible individuals.
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 543-44 (quoting S. REP. No. 337, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 17 (1990)).
156
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 544.
157

Id.

158
159

511 U.S. at 175 (1994).
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 544. In CentralBank of Denver, the Supreme Court held that

Congress's omission of "aiding and abetting" from the language of §10(b) concluded the issue of the
statute's reach and coverage." Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 544 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver,511 U.S.
at 175 (1994)). "The proscription [of the statute] does not include giving aid to a person who commits
a manipulative or deceptive act. We cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts that are not
themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the statute" Id. at 544 (quoting Cent. Bank
of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177-78). As the Court pointed out, a critical element of Rule lOb-5 liability,
reliance on a defendant's misstatement or omission, would be missing if liability were to be imposed on
aiders and abetters. Id. (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 180).
160
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 544 (citing In re PrudentialIns. Co., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16397 (D.N.J. May 10, 1996) (CentralBankstrongly implies that respondeatsuperior liability is not available
under §10(b)); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 592
(S.D.N.Y., Jan. 23, 1996) (holding that defendant found not liable under Rule lOb-5 for alleged
misrepresentations of its managers in light of the holding of Central Bank).
161
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 544-545; see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174 (stating
that to make out a cause ofaction for an omission, or failure to speak, in a securities case, a plaintiff must
plead an affirmative duty of disclosure).
162

445 U.S. 222 (1980).

163

Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 545 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228) (internal citations

omitted).
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plaintiffs made no allegation that any such duty or relationship existed, and
acknowledged that the fiduciary duty Vinik owed was to Magellan's
shareholders and not to the investing public at large.' 64
In cases where the allegations are of affirmative misrepresentations, the
court stated that the law imposes broader liability.'65 Corporate insiders are,
therefore, held to fiduciary standards to prevent them from taking unfair
advantage of uninformed investors.' 66 Under such standards, "[a] duty
derivative of
that imposed on insiders is also applied to 'tippees ' 167 and to
'scalpers."" 68 In addition, a viable §10(b) claim can be successfully pled
without any allegations that a fiduciary relationship existed. 169 The court,
therefore, concluded that this case was the direct opposite of a scalping case
because Vinik's alleged purpose was to encourage the public to believe that
he had an interest which he did not actually have, rather than to hide any
investment in Micron. 70 Nonetheless, the court found the plaintiffs'
analysis of the defendants' actions under a classical model of scalping to be
persuasive.
164

Id.

165

Id.; see generally Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (lst Cir. 1996); Backman

v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22,
26 (1st Cir. 1987).
166 Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 545 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229).
167
Id. (citing SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631-33 (7th Cir. 1995)). A "tippee" is someone who
acquires nonpublic information from someone who enjoys a fiduciary relationship with the firm to
which such information pertains. Jonathan R. Macey, PolicyAnalysis: SEC's InsiderTrainingProposal:Good
Politics, Bad Policy, CATO POLIcy ANALYSIS 101, n. 18 (1988) available at http://www.cato.org/cgibin/scripts/printtech.cgi/pubs/pas/pal01.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
"[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on
material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know
that there has been a breach."
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
168
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 545 (citing SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711(6th Cir. 1985))
(showing ostensibly disinterested investment advisers recommending stocks without revealing their
personal stake in the transaction). "A scalper seeks to profit by taking advantage of changing market
conditions which will affect prices of options before those conditions become manifest in the market."
Schultz v. SEC, 614 F.2d 561, 566, n.6 (1980).
169 Fidelity/Micron,964 F. Supp. at 545.
170

Id.

171

Id. Vinik publicly stated or implied that Magellan would not sell its substantial holding in

Micron, which he communicated as a"buy," knowing that his power and influence over the marketwas
such that investors would respond by buying Micron, and thereby allow defendants to dump Micron
at prices inflated by his favorable statements. There is authority supporting the plaintiffs' contention that
"the 'scalping' theory of manipulation is not premised on the making of misrepresentations that only
relate to the giving of investment advice, as suggested by defendants." See also Abelson v. Strong, 644
F. Supp. 524, 527-528 (D. Mass. 1986).
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Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in a securities
manipulation scheme under a "Fraud on the Market Theory."' 72 As noted
above, in a "Fraud on the Market" case, the statements identified by plaintiffs as actionably misleading are alleged to have caused injury by impacting
the market price of the purchased security and not through the plaintiffs'
direct reliance upon them.'73 The defendants, in response to the plaintiffs'
allegation that their statements "artificially inflate[d], manipulate[d] and
support[ed] the demand for ...
Micron," argued that the complaint failed to
demonstrate that any of Vinik's statements were false and thus were
incapable of misleading the market.' 74 The court dismissed this defense and
stated that "[s]ome statements, although literally accurate, can become,
through their context and manner of presentation, devices which mislead

172

Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 546; see supra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion

of the "Fraud on the Market Theory." In the plaintiffs' complaint, they allege that:
Prior to the beginning of the Class Period, the defendants embarked upon a plan, scheme,
and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did;
(a) deceive the investing public, including plaintiffs and the other Class members, concerning
the defendants' intentions to maintain their large holdings of technology stocks in general,
and Micron common stock in particular, when in fact defendants not only intended to but
were in fact divesting or selling their technology stocks, particularly Micron stock;
(b) artificially inflate, manipulate and support the demand for the volume of trading in, and
the market price of technology stocks, particularly Micron common stock, so that defendants
could secretly dump most of their investment in technology stocks, and in particular nearly
all of their Micron investment, in order to realize greater proceeds on those investments than
they would have had the market become aware of defendants' intent to sell or actual selling
of such stock;
(c) cause plaintiffs and other members of the Class to purchase Micron stock at artificially
inflated and manipulated prices while Magellan and other Fidelity Funds were secretly
liquidating their investments in Micron at those prices;
(d) allow Magellan and other Fidelity Funds to attract both additional investors and monetary
contributions from existing customers as Magellan and the other Fidelity Funds reported
gains in their technology holdings and Micron stock, which absent the course of conduct
specified herein, they would not otherwise have obtained;
(e) allow Vinik to increase his substantial salary, and any bonus based on Magellan's
performance; and
() allow Fidelity Management to increase its substantial management or other fees from
Magellan, which fees were specifically pegged to Magellan's asset size and its performance
relative to the S&P 500 index.
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 546.
173
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 546 (internal citations omitted). When the truth is revealed
and the market self-corrects, investors who bought at the inflated price suffer losses. Those losses are
attributable to the defendants' statements, even without direct reliance by plaintiffs, because the
statements were presumptively absorbed into and reflected by the security's price. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the "Fraud on the Market Theory."
174
Fidelity/Micron, 964 F. Supp. at 546-547.

270 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:243
investors. For that reason, the disclosure required by the securities laws is
measured not by literal truth, but by the ability of the material to accurately
inform rather than mislead prospective buyers. '175 The court determined
that the import of the defendants' words was a question of fact, and
therefore denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' charge of
fraud under §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5
thereunder as it
176
applied to defendants FMR, FMR Corp. and Vinik.
D. Infamous Internet Pump And Dump Schemes Committed By Greedy
"Nobodies" Who Caused The Share Price Of Several Penny And MicroCapitalizationStocks To Be Artificially Inflated While They Cashed In And
"LaughedAll The Way To The Bank."
1. DOUGLAS W. COLT

In lateJanuary, 1999, Douglas W. Colt created Fast-Trades.com ("FastTrades"), an internet stock selection website. 7 v Fast-Trades offered its
subscribers a free "six month trial period," which the website stated was a
"limited time offer." 7 Subscribers were notified about stock selections
175

Id. at 547 (quoting McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm't, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir.
1990)). "Emphasis and gloss can, in the right circumstances, create liability." See alsoJonesv. Bowman,
694 F. Supp. 538, 547 (quoting Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186,203 (5th Cir. 1988).
"When a corporation does make a disclosure-whether it be voluntary or required-there is a duty to
make it complete and accurate." (quoting Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 16 (1st Cir. 1987).
"A corporation, in other words, has a duty to ensure that material information is disclosed in such a way
that it can be understood by the investing public in essentially the same way as it would be perceived by
corporate insiders."
176 Jones, 694 F. Supp. at 549.
177
In re Kenneth Terrell, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 42483,2000 SEC LEXIS
394, at *6 (Mar. 2, 2000). Douglas Colt began trading stocks in the summer of 1998, when he opened
a margin account at Charles Schwab & Co. SEC v. Colt, No. CV-1:00CV00423, 1 14-17 (D.D.C.
2002), available at http://www.johnreedstark.com/ClassMaterials/Complaints.Colt%20Complaint.htm
(last visited Nov. 2, 2004). Through 1998 and early 1999, Colt predominately traded technology and
penny stocks in which he held positions for only a few days or weeks. In total, Colt bought and sold
approximately thirteen positions before he began making recommendations on the Fast-Trades website.
Colt's trading in these thirteen stocks yielded a total net profit of approximately $24. In light of Colt's
unfavorable record for picking stocks, Fast-Trades posted a "track record" that listed alleged previous
picks, the highest price the stock reached after that pick, and a "stable high" price supposedly showing
a price at which the stock settled after Fast-Trades recommended it. In its Complaint, the SEC alleged
that, "[t] he 'track record' of alleged previous stock picks that Colt included on the Fast-Trades website
was materially false and misleading. In his posted track record, Colt included the names and short term
performance of some stocks that had never been selected by Fast-Trades. He did this in order to
artificially enhance Fast-Trades' stock-picking credibility with substantial subscribers.
178
Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *6 (stating that in light of Fast-Trades' claim that its services
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from Fast-Trades in one of two ways: either through a password protected
area of the website that enabled subscribers to learn of selections one day in
advance of its release to the public; or by having the selection emailed to
them at the same time that it was posted to subscribers on the website.7 9
Colt was the lone "researcher" for Fast-Trades and made all of the website's
stock recommendations. 8 '
Following an increase in the price of Electrosource, Inc. after his "test"
recommendation, Colt and his participants in the Fast-Trades scheme began
to purchase other stocks prior to their disclosure as a Fast-Trades
selection.' 8' For all four recommendations, purchases made by Fast-Trades
increased the price and volume of the selections prior to disclosing the
chosen stock to subscribers. 8 2 Fast-Trades' first recommendation was
Apache Medical Systems.ls3 On February 16, 1999, less than an hour before
the selection of Apache Medical Systems was sent to subscribers, Colt
purchased 5,000 shares at $1.0625 per share. ' Shortly thereafter, but before
were being offered without charge for the first six months, no subscriber ever paid a fee).
179
Id. at *6. Prior to engaging in any trades based on a recommendation from Fast-Trades, Colt
decided to test what impact the release of his stock selection would have on the Market. On February
1, 1999, Colt recommended Electrosource, Inc., and watched its price increase by thirty-five percent
shortly after the selections announcement. Id. at *6-7.
180
Id. at *6. Colt was also joined in the Fast-Trades scheme by Kenneth Terrell and Jason
Wyckoff, his law school roommates during the 1998-99 academic year. Shortly after Colt started the
Fast-Trades website, he offered his roommates the opportunity to participate in Fast-Trades. Colt
advised them that he had posted a stock recommendation on the website and monitored the market to
see how his selection affected the stock. If they agreed to help, Colt agreed to permit them to trade on
Fast-Trades' selections through his account. Terrell and Wyckoff agreed to participate with Colt, and
during February and March, 1999, the two spent extensive amounts of time posting materially false and
misleading messages on several hundred different Yahoo! internet message boards promoting FastTrades to potential subscribers. Colt's roommates each gave Colt money to purchase shares on their
behalf in Colt's brokerage account. Id. at *7.
181
Id. at *8. As the chart below illustrates, participants in the Fast-Trades scheme and their two
friends collectively purchased an increasing number of shares with each selection.
Security
Apache Medical
Option Care
American Education
Artecon

Fast-Trades
Related Purchase
5,000
24,000
36,283
51,512

Average
Daily Volume
11,694
13,823
3,454
33,341

%of Average
Daily Volume
43%
174%
1050%
154%

Id. at *8; Colt, No. CV-1:00CV00423, 14-17 (D.D.C. 2002), availableat http://www.johnreedstark
.con/ClassMaterials/Complaints.Colt%2OComplaint.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
182
Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *8.
183

Id. at *9.

184

Id. at *9. Of the 5,000 shares of Apache Medical Systems that Colt purchased, 4,000 were for
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the selection was released, Colt placed a sell limit order' of $4.00 per share
for his newly acquired Apache Medical Systems stock. 18 6 In the twenty
minute period between Colt's purchase and the time the Fast-Trades
selection was sent out, Apache Medical Systems' price increased by 41% to
$1.50 per share.'
In the time shortly thereafter, the price of Apache
Medical Systems stock reached an intraday high of $6.785 per share, an
increase of more than 600% above the price of Colt's purchase only hours
earlier.'
As Colt sat at his computer and watched the price of Apache
Medical Systems soar, he adjusted his sell limit twice in a matter of
minutes.189 In the end, Colt and his colleagues at Fast-Trades managed to
make a collective profit of $27,937.50 by trading the stock
ofApache Medical
19°
Systems that they owned in just a thirty minute span.
On February 24, 1999, Fast-Trades selected Option Care as its second
recommendation.' 9 Prior to sending an email to Fast-Trades' subscribers
advising them of the latest selection, Colt purchased 10,000 shares of Option
Care at $1.625 per share and then placed a sell limit order to dispose of the
stock at $5.00 per share."9 After sending notification of the selection to FastTrades' subscribers, the price of Option Care rose to an intraday high of
$5.875 per share, a price movement of $4.25 per share more than Colt's first
purchase.' 93 Colt's sell limit order was filled at $5.375 per share shortly after
Fast-Trades' announcement. 94 As a result of manipulating the price of

himself and 500 each were for Terrell and Wyckoff. Colt's purchase represented over 40% of the 11,700
share total average daily volume of Apache Medical Systems. Id. at *8.
185
A sell limit order is "an order to a broker to sell a specified quantity of a security at or above
the specified price." WebFinance, Inc., investorwords.com, at http://www.investorwords.com/4479/sell_
limitorder.html (last visited November 22, 2004).
186
Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *9.
187
Id. at *9-10.
188
Id. at *10.
189

Id.

190

Id. Apache Medical Systems reported a trading volume of 1,085,600 shares on February 6,
1999. Within a few hours ofbeing recommended by Fast-Trades, Apache Medical Systems' stock price
collapsed. Only days later, Apache Medical Systems was trading within pennies of its price at the time
of its recommendation on Fast-Trades. Id. at *10-11.
191
Id. at *11.
192
Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *11. Colt purchased 8,000 shares for himself and another
1,000 each for Terrell and Wyckoff. When Colt purchased his 10,000 shares at 11 A.M. on February 24,
1999, there were no prior trades in Option Care on that day. In addition, Colt's purchase amounted to
approximately 70% of the 14,000 share total average daily volume of Option Care. Id.
193
Id. at *11-12.

194

Id. at *12.
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Option Care, Colt and his Fast-Trades associates made a collective profit of
$37,500.195

The third Fast-Trades recommendation for American Education
Corporation stock was released on March 5, 1999.196 Before this selection
was revealed to Fast-Trades' subscribers, Colt purchased 19,000 shares of
American Education Corporation stock. 197 Shortly thereafter, Colt placed
a sell limit order for $6.50 per share. 9 ' Following the release of American
Education Corporation as a Fast-Trades selection, the stock achieved an
intraday high of $10.00, an increase of $8.75-or more than 700% above the
price of Colt's purchase. 9 9 As a result of their trading in American
Education Corporation stock, Colt, Terrell and Wyckoff reaped a net profit
of $41,093.75 and Joanne Colt made $59,984.37.200

The fourth and final recommendation made by Fast Trades, Artecon,
Inc., was purchased by Colt, his associates, and their friends.2 °' Immediately
before this selection was announced to Fast-Trades' subscribers, Colt
purchased 18,282 shares of Artecon on March 10, 1999.202 Prior to the
disclosure of the selection, sell limit orders were placed on the 51,512 total
Artecon shares purchased by Colt, his Fast-Trades associates and their
friends. 2 3 Both Colt and Joanne Colt knew that their purchases of Artecon

195

Id. Option Care reported a trading volume of 1,290,100 shares on February 24 1999. Within

a few hours of being recommended by Fast-Trades, Option Care's stock price collapsed. Only days
later, Option Care was trading within pennies of its price at the time of its recommendation on FastTrades. Id. at*11-12.
196
Id. at *14.
197
Id. Of the shares ofAmerican Education Corporation stock that Colt purchased, 10,000 were
for himself, 4,000 each were purchased for Terrell and Wyckoffand another 1,000 shares were purchased
for another of Colt's law school friends who became a participant in the Fast-Trades scheme. In
addition, Colt advised his mother, Joanne Colt, to purchase shares ofAmerican Education Corporation
in advance of its disclosure as a Fast-Trades selection. Acting on the advice, Joanne Colt purchased
10,750 shares ofAmerican Education Corporation stock and entered sell limit orders ranging from $4.50
and $7.00 per share. Joanne Colt then passed the tip to purchase American Education Corporation stock
on to her friend who subsequently purchased 4,533 shares and then entered sell limit orders staggered
between $4.00 and $5.00 per share. Id. at *14-15.
198
Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *14.
199
Id. at *16.
Id. In addition, Colt's law school friend made a profit of $3,500 selling American Education
200
Corporation stock while Joanne Colt's friend made a profit of $15,899. On March 5, 1999, American
Education Corporation reported a trading volume of 842,600 shares. Within a few hours of being
recommended by Fast-Trades, American Education Corporation's stock price collapsed. Only days later,
American Education Corporation was trading within pennies of its price at the time of its
recommendation on Fast-Trades. Id. at *14-15.
202

Id. at "16-17.

202

Id.
Id.

203
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stock were increasing its share price because over the course of a few hours
the price they paid had increased from $1.125 per share to $1.34 per share.2 °4
As with the previous three Fast-Trades' selections, the price of Artecon
increased dramatically following its recommendation. 20 5 Artecon achieved
an intraday high of $6.00 per share, an increase of $4.875 per share from the
price of Colt's first purchase. 20 6 The result of Colt's trading in Artecon stock
yielded him, Terrell, and Wyckoff a profit of $66,516.36 and Joanne Colt
made $47,081.25.207
All of the participants in the Fast-Trades scheme had little or no
knowledge about stocks and the securities markets. 20 ' Despite their lack of
investing experience, Colt, Terrell, Wyckoff and their friend from law
school posted hundreds of false or misleading messages on internet message
boards. 20 9 Most of these messages were advertisements for Fast-Trades to
prospective subscribers.2 10 In addition to posting advertisements for Fast-

204

Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *18. On March 10, before Colt began buying Artecon

(ARTE), only 800 shares were traded and the price remained steady at $ 1.125 per share. From 10:11
a.m.,when Colt's first trade was reported, until 11:30 a.m. when the Fast-Trades recommendation went
out, total tradingvolume ofArtecon, Inc. increased to 164,500 shares and the price rose to $1.375, a 22%
increase in two hours. Id. at *17-18.
205
206

Id.
Id.

207 Id. at *19. In addition, Colt's law school friend received a profit of $15,474.37 while Joanne
Colt's friend earned $34,937.00. On March 10, 1999, Artecon reported a trading volume of 4,581,000
shares. Within a few hours of being recommended by Fast-Trades, Artecon's stock price collapsed.
Only days later, Artecon was trading within pennies of its price at the time of its recommendation on
Fast-Trades. Id. at *18-19.
208

Id.

Id. at *21. In an April 29, 1999 online message board posting criticizing an unrelated stock
picking website, and again using an alias, Colt set forth an eleven-point blueprint for a price
manipulation scheme:
Colt's blueprint posting stated: (1) screen for thinly traded stocks in the $1 to $2 range; (2)
get rid of all the oil and gas stocks because "they're not trendy"; (3) modify the screen to find
companies that have shown revenue increases in the last quarter, "so you canjustify this gem
to the world"; (4) of the remaining stocks, look for one with very low average volume and low
float; (5) pull together information from optimistic company press releases; (6) "throw in
some bull**** about the company being an internet wonder"; (7) "buy a bunch of this
garbage stock"; (8) "tell your idiot subscribers about how great the stock is, and, like sheep,
they will run out and buy it"; (9) "dump the shares you bought a few hours ago to all of these
suckers"; (10) "watch the stock steadily tank for the next month"; and (11) "laugh all the way
to the bank."
Colt, No. CV-1:00CV00423, at 18, available at http://www.johnreedstark.com/ClassMaterials/
Complaints/Colt%20Complaint.htm (last visited November 22, 2004).
210
Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *21. The purpose of these messages was to build the
subscriber base by inducing readers of the message boards to visit Fast-Trades.com, to review its
recommendations and to become subscribers, so that they would in turn purchase its recommendations
2W9
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Trades, Terrell also posted messages on internet web boards defending
investor allegations that the website engaged in price manipulation."'
Terrell misrepresented his identity in those messages and cited securities law
statutes which he believed demonstrated that Fast-Trades' activities were
legal.212
As a means to evade liability for their fraudulent trading scheme, Colt
and his Fast-Trades associates posted various disclaimers on the website.1 3
However, the Commission concluded that these disclaimers were materially
misleading as to the real trading intent of the Fast-Trades participants.2 4
The Commission noted that Fast-Trades participants had already purchased
shares in the recommended stock before subscribers even received the
recommendation and Colt and his associates had already placed orders to sell
the stock and expected those orders to be filled by the increase in price and
volume caused by the purchases of their subscribers. 21 The Commission
noted that, "[i]f Fast-Trades had accurately disclosed their trading
intentions, subscribers would have been able to deduce that the only reason
Colt offered his 'free' service was so he could further influence the market
price movement initiated by his purchase of the recommended stock just
before the announcement., 216 Colt was, therefore, able to "condition the
market and then profit at the expense of his subscribers by executing pre-set

and in turn, drive up the price of the selection. Colt, Terrell, Wyckoffand their friend from law school
all made such postings. Colt taught each of them how to create on-line "identities," and how to post
messages to internet message boards at financial websites such as Yahoo.com and RagingBull.com. As
they had been instructed by Colt, they did not disclose their affiliation with Fast-Trades and they used
multiple identities to enhance the credibility of their messages. Colt also encouraged them to
misrepresent substantive information, such as their investment successes from following Fast-Trades'
recommendations, to draw readers of the message boards to the Fast-Trades site. Id. at *21-22.
211
Id.
212
Id. at *22-23. In a message posted to the Yahoo! message board related to Option Care,
Terrell falsely stated that he had "tried to get the SEC to take a look into [Fast-Trades], but apparently
they can't do anything about it." Id. at *23.
213
Id. at *23. At the time that the Apache Medical Systems recommendation was made, FastTrades contained a disclaimer that, "[w]e may buy or sell our picks at any time." Following that
recommendation, Colt, Terrell, Wyckoff and their law school friend, revised various aspects of the
disclaimer, including the portion addressing their trading in Fast-Trades' selections. From that point
on, through the other three recommendations they traded in, the disclaimer read, in relevant part:
"FastTrades representatives may, and in many cases do, invest or hold positions in the companies that
FastTrades recommends; FastTrades representatives reserve the right to buy or sell securities
recommended by FastTrades at any time." Id. at *23-24.
214

Id. at *24.

215

Id.

216

Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *23-24.
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sales of the recommended stock at inflated prices to a market that was likely
217
to include subscribers.,
In an offer of settlement that was formally accepted by the SEC on
March 2, 2000, the Commission made the following observations about the
type of fraud committed by Colt and his associates through Fast-Trades:
The internet today affords investors unprecedented access to information about investment opportunities. Yet the innovative technology of the internet has created new opportunities for individuals to
deceive investors. Information placed on the internet instantaneously reaches thousands of individuals, and may have an unwarranted aura of legitimacy. Thus, those willing to break the law have a
very effective medium to perpetrate fraud on the securities markets.
The type of activity involved in this case was not new-it was a
variation of a "pump and dump" scheme. What was novel was the
way that internet technology was used to promote the stocks and
deceive investors. Attempts to deceive investors or disrupt the
securities markets, whether such schemes are perpetrated on the
internet or by more traditional means, will not be tolerated.21
The Commission also noted that investors should be skeptical of internet
websites that proclaim expert stock recommendations.2 1 9 In cautioning the
investing public about bulletin board messages and chat rooms that hype
either a particular stock or a recommendation website, the Commission
stated that, "[i] nvestors must continue to rely on the hallmarks of good
investing practices: diligence, analysis and research."" 0 Accordingly, Terrell,
Wyckoff, Colt's law school friend andJoanne Colt all consented to cease and
desist from committing or causing any violations or future violations of
§10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder pursuant to §21C of
the Exchange Act 21 for causing Colt's violation of the same.", In addition,

219

Id.
Id. at *25-26.
See id. at *26.

220

Id.

221

Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *26-27. Section 21C of the Exchange Act provides in relevant

217

218

part that:
Ifthe Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any person is violating,
has violated, or is about to violate any provision of this title, or any rule or regulation
thereunder, the Commission may publish its findings and enter an order requiring such
person, and any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act
or omission the person knew or should have known would contribute to such violation, to
cease and desist from committing or causing such violation and any future violation of the
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Colt consented, while neither admitting nor denying the allegations of the
complaint, to the entry of the injunction, and, based on his demonstrated
financial inability to pay, the SEC waived payment of disgorgement and
prejudgment interest and did not seek the imposition of a civil penalty.2 3
2. JONATHAN G. LEBED
Jonathan Lebed, a fifteen-year-old high school student from Cedar
Grove, NewJersey, is the youngest person ever to be prosecuted by the SEC
for securities fraud.224 On eleven separate occasions between August 23,
1999 and February 4, 2000, Lebed engaged in a scheme to manipulate the
price of thinly traded microcap stocks that he had just purchased by sending
numerous false or misleading messages over the internet touting their
performance. 225 All of Lebed's trades were placed through custodial
accounts6 that were located at two broker-dealers and titled in his father's
name.

22

same provision, rule, or regulation. Such order may, in addition to requiring a person to cease
and desist from committing or causing a violation, require such person to comply, or to take
steps to effect compliance, with such provision, rule, or regulation, upon such terms and
conditions and within such time as the Commission may specify in such order. Any such
order may, as the Commission deems appropriate, require future compliance or steps to
effect future compliance, either permanently or for such period of time as the Commission
may specify, with such provision, rule, or regulation with respect to any security, any issuer,
or any other person.
15 U.S.C. S 77h-1 (a) (2004). Despite fining Terrell, Wysckoff, andJoanne Colt the sums of$10,314.87,
$4,500, and $157,901.62, respectively, the Commission waived the payments because each Respondent
demonstrated a financial inability to pay. See Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *28.
2n
The Commission noted that Terrell, Wyckoff, Altman andJoanne Colt " knew or should have
known that their acts or omissions to act would contribute to such violations" based on the nature of
their activities. Id. at *25.
M2 Terrell, 2000 SEC LEXIS 394, at *3. See generallySEC Sues Washington, DC-Area Law Students
for Internet PriceManipulation; Scheme Architect's Mother-a ColoradoSprings, CO City Councilwoman-Also
Charged, 1, 2 (Mar., 2, 2000) (providing a summary of the events in the form of a press release), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-20.txt (last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
24
See Michael LewisJonathan Lebed's ExtracurricularActivities, NYTIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 25,
2001, at 26. See also In re Jonathan G. Lebed, Exchange Act Release No. 43307, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1964,
at "1-2 (Sept. 20, 2000) (admin. proceeding).
225
Lebed, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1964, at *2. The stocks manipulated by Lebed included: Manchester
Equipment Company, Inc.; Just Toys, Inc.; Yes Entertainment, Inc.; Fotoball USA, Inc.; Man Sang
Holdings, Inc.; West Coast Entertainment, Inc.; Havana Republic, Inc.; Classica Group, Inc.; and
Firetector, Inc. Id. at *2 n.1.
226 However, Lebed made all of the trading decisions. Id. at *3.
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Lebed's internet postings and their subsequent effect on the market all
mirrored the same pattern. 227 First, Lebed would target a thinly traded
microcap stock that was usually traded on the NASD Electronic Bulletin
Board of the NASDAQ National Market.228 Next, he would acquire a
position in that company, buying between 17% and 46% of the daily trading
volume on the date of his purchase.2 29 The momentum of Lebed's purchase
alone would usually cause the price of the stock to rise. 30 Within hours of
making his purchase, but after the market had closed for the day, Lebed
would usually begin posting false and misleading messages about the
stock.23' During his initial round ofpostings, Lebed would post between 200
and 300 identical messages toYahoo! Finance message boards using multiple
fictitious names2 32 The morning after acquiring his position in the targeted
stock, but before or concurrent with the market opening, Lebed would post
another wave of false and/or misleading messages.3 3 The posted messages
always caused the price and volume of the touted stocks to increase
dramatically.2 34 On that day, as the stock price was rising in reaction to the
hundreds of messages he had posted, Lebed would sell his entire position in

227

See id.

228

Id.

229

Id.

230

Id.

See Lebed, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1964, at *3-4. For example, Lebed logged onto the Internet and
posted 200 separate times the following plug for a company called Firetector (ticker symbol FTEC):
Subj: THE MOST UNDERVALUED STOCK EVER
Date: 2/03/00 3:43pm Pacific Standard Time
From: LebedTG1
FTEC is starting to break out! Next week, this thing will EXPLODE ....
Currently FTEC is trading forjust $2 1/2! 1am expecting to see FTEC at $20 VERY SOON.
Let me explain why ....
Revenues for the year should very conservatively be around $20 million. The average
company in the industry trades with a price/sales ratio of 3.45. With 1.57 million shares
$44.
outstanding, this will value FTEC at ...
It is very possible that FTEC will see $44, but since I would like to remain very conservative
my short-term target price on FTEC is still $20!
...
The FTEC offices are extremely busy. ... I am hearing that a number of HUGE deals are
being worked on. Once we get some news from FTEC and the word gets out about the
company ...
it will take-off to MUCH HIGHER LEVELS!
I see little risk when purchasing FTEC at these DIRT-CHEAP PRICES. FTEC is making
TREMENDOUS PROFITS and is trading UNDER BOOK VALUE!!!"
Lewis, supra note 224, at 28.
232
Lebed, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1964, at *4.
231

733

Id.

Lebed's liquidation would cause the trading volume in the stock to reach either record or near
record highs. On occasion, the stock would reach a 52-week high for both volume and price. Id. at *5.
234
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the particular stock, each time realizing a profit.235 The gross profits of the
eleven transactions ranged from more than $11,000 to nearly $74,000. 36
In its Order, the SEC only described one of Lebed's fraudulent
transactions, which it stated was representative of his others. OnJanuary 5,
2000, Lebed purchased 18,000 shares of Man Sang Holdings, Inc. (ticker
symbol "MSHI") at prices ranging from $1.375 to $2.00 per share 23 7 While
the trading volume of MSHI on December 30, 1999 was 100 shares with a
closing price of$1.125 per share, onJanuary 5, 2000, the volume was 60,700
shares at a closing price of $1.8125 per share. 23 8 On the evening ofJanuary
5,2000, Lebed posted messages onYahoo! Finance message boards claiming
that MSHI was "the most undervalued stock in history" and would be
trading at more than $20 per share "very soon." 23 9 On January 6, 2000, in
response to the messages posted by Lebed, the volume of trading skyrocketed to 1,074,900 shares at a high of $4.6875 per share. 24" Lebed sold all
18,000 of his shares of MSHI on January 6, 2000 at prices ranging from
$3.8125 to $4.00 per share at a net profit of $34,959.241 MSHI issued no
press releases and there was no news in the marketplace during this time
period to account for the rise in price and volume.
Three weeks later, Lebed again manipulated the price of MSHI stock.
From January 27, 2000, the date he purchased MSHI and posted messages
touting the stock (again predicting a price of $20 "very soon"), until the
following day, January 28, 2000, the date he liquidated his entire position,
the volume of the stock increased from 71,500 to 1,879,000 shares, and the
pricejumped from $2.25 per share to a high of $5.125 per share.242 Both the
price and volume were 52-week highs,243 and upon selling his holdings,
Lebed realized a net profit of $37,901.24
In the end, Lebed made in excess of $800,000 manipulating the share
price of the various stocks that he touted, yet he only had to pay $272,826 in
disgorgement and $12,174 in prejudgment interest for a total amount of
$285,000.245 When asked why the SEC allowed Lebed to retain over
235

Id. at *4.

236

Id.

237

Id. at *5.

238

Lebed, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1964, at *5.

239

Id. It appears that Lebed's bulletin board messages all contained the same or similar context.
See Lewis, supra note 224, at 28, for an example of his postings.
240
Lebed, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1964, at *5.
241
Id. at *5-6. MSHI issued no press releases, and there was no news in the marketplace during
this time period to account for the rise in price and volume.
242

Id. at *6.

243

Id.

244

Id.

245

Id. at *7. See also Lewis, supra note 224, at 26.
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$500,000 of his ill-gotten gains, then Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt,
stated that, "[w]e determined that those profits were different from the
profits he made on the 11 trades we defined as illegal., 246 Levitt, however,
refused to differentiate between Lebed's legal trades and his allegedly illegal
one, saying that to do so "wouldn't be appropriate. 247 In a now infamous
article about this case, author Michael Lewis, discussing Lebed's settlement
with the SEC, noted:
[T]he S.E.C. let Jonathan Lebed walk away with 500 grand in his
pocket because it feared that if it didn't, it would wind up in court
and it would lose. And if the law ever declared formally that
Jonathan Lebed didn't break it, the S.E.C. would be faced with an
impossible situation: millions of small investors plugging their
portfolios with abandon, becoming in essence professional financial
analysts, generating embarrassing little explosions of unreality in
every corner of the capital markets. No central authority could
sustain the illusion that stock prices were somehow "real" or that the
market wasn't, for most people, a site of not terribly productive
leisure activity. The red dog would be off his leash.248
Nonetheless, Lebed's penalty remains one of the largest ever collected by the
SEC for a lay persons' perpetration of a "pump and dump" scheme.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Step One: DeterminingMateriality

Chairman William 0. Douglass, speaking about the SEC, once noted
that "[w]e are the investor's advocate.,' 249 This sentiment is clearly reflected
in §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 2"° Although the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws were enacted to apply equally to
anyone who violates them, the question remains as to whether they should
be so broad as to encompass all individuals regardless of experience and
qualifications as an analyst or securities professional. And, if they should,

246
247
248

Lewis, supra note 224, at 59.
Id.
Id.

249
The exact citation for the quote is unknown. The quote appears on a sign hanging outside
of the William 0. Douglass Room at the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and is
readily understood to be attributable to him..
250
See supra text accompanying note 2.
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one must consider whether the costs associated with enforcing those securities laws aimed at curtailing fraud are worth it in light of the fact that many
of the sources of market information (or misinformation) have little or no
credibility whatsoever. In those cases where an investor is willfully blind to
the warning signs that would otherwise cause a "reasonable investor" to
ignore the advice being offered, the securities laws should not punish those
who make materially false and misleading statements about various securities
in violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act. As the government cannot serve
as a guard against the use of ordinary common sense, a three-step analysis
should be utilized in determining for which investors the SEC must serve
as an advocate.
1. Is THE STATEMENT MATERIAL?
The first step that should be utilized in determining whether an
individual has violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
thereunder is analyzing the individual's statements to see if they contain any
material misstatements of fact or omissions. Those statements that are
found to be immaterial are clearly not in violation of§ 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule lOb-5 thereunder and thus, no further analysis is required.
Materiality is a "fact-specific inquiry," which "depends on the significance
the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information., 25 1 In cases with "contingent or speculative information or
events," materiality "will depend ... upon a balancing of both the indicated
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity.,, 25 2 This step focuses on
the actual alleged misstatement as opposed to looking at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the statement. An examination of additional
factors that are traditionally taken into account as part of
a materiality
253
analysis provides the basis for Step Three discussed below.

251

Hillson Partners, L.P. v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Basic, Inc.

v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988)).
252
Id. at 209 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (internal citations omitted)).
253
As this article suggests, these additional factors such as the source of the information and
factors relating to the company being misrepresented should be viewed aside from a determination as
to whether the actual misstatement is material because most misstatements in a securities manipulation
scheme are on their face clear indications of the perpetrator's intent to induce the investing public into
buying the stock in violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. For example, a statement such as,
"This is the next stock to go up 500 percent" is in and of itself a material misstatement; however, the
attempted securities manipulation may be deemed immaterial in light of an analysis under the additional
factors.
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In TSC Industries,Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,254 the Supreme Court considered
the definition of a material fact under the proxy rules promulgated by the
SEC 255 and the appropriateness of resolving the question of materiality by
summaryjudgment.25 6 In its analysis, the Court stated that:
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective
one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact
to a reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general

254

426 U.S. 438 (1976). The facts are as follows:

The dispute in this case centers on the acquisition of TSC Industries, Inc., by National
Industries, Inc. In February 1969 National acquired 34% ofTSC's voting securities by purchase[ing them] from ... TSC's founder and principal shareholder.... Thereafter, five
National nominees were placed on TSC's board.... On October 16, 1969, the TSC board,
with the attending National nominees abstaining, approved a proposal to liquidate and sell
all ofTSC's assets to National. The proposal in substance provided for the exchange ofTSC
common and Series 1preferred stock for National Series B preferred stock and warrants. On
November 12, 1969, TSC and National issued ajoint proxy statement to their shareholders,
recommending approval of the proposal. The proxy solicitation was successful, TSC was
placed in liquidation and dissolution, and the exchange of shares was effected. This is an
action brought by respondent Northway, a TSC shareholder, against TSC and National,
claiming that theirjoint proxy statement was incomplete and materially misleading in violation of§14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder.
Id. at 440-41.
255
Although an understanding of the proxy rules is not germane to the issue presented in this
article, at the time TSC v. Northway was decided, Rule 14a-9(a) promulgated by the SEC under the
Exchange Act provided that:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means ofany proxy statement, form
ofproxy, notice ofmeeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement
which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to
correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy
for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
Id. at 443.
256

Id. at 440.

The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, involving
as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts. In considering whether
summaryjudgment on the issue is appropriate, we must bear in mind that the underlying
objective facts, which will often be free from dispute, are merely the starting point for the
ultimate determination ofmateriality. The determination requires delicate assessments ofthe
inferences a "reasonable shareholder" would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier
of fact. Only if the established omissions are 'so obviously important to an investor, that
reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality' is the ultimate issue of
materiality appropriately resolved 'as a matter of law' by summary judgment.
Id. at 450 (quotingJohns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F. 2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)).
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test of materiality occur in the articulation ofjust how significant a
fact must be or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact
would affect a reasonable investor's judgment.5 7
Guided by this belief, the Court concluded that "[a]n omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote."252 The Court also
noted that its test for materiality considers a demonstration of a substantial
likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact (or material
misstatement) actually played a significant role in the reasonable shareholder's decision.5 9
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,26 the Supreme Court considered the standard
of materiality applicable to preliminary merger discussions. 261 Referring to
its earlier decision in TSC Industries, which was one of the earliest cases to
define "material" within the context of the federal securities laws, the Court
noted that it was careful not to set too low a standard of materiality.262 In
addition, the Court stated that it was concerned that a minimal standard
might bring an overabundance of information within its reach, and lead
management "simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial
information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed decision

257

Id. at445.

258
259

Id. at 449.
Id. ("Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure ofthe omitted

fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available.").
260
485 U.S. 224 (1988). The facts of the case follow:
Beginning in September 1976, Combustion [Engineering, Inc.] representatives had meetings
and telephone conversations with Basic [, Inc.] officers and directors including [the] petitioners, concerning the possibility of a merger. During 1977 and 1978, Basic made three
public statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations. On December 18,
1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its
shares and issued
a release stating that it had been 'approached' by another company concerning a merger. On
December 19, Basic's board endorsed Combustion's offer of $46 per share for its common
stock, and on the following day publicly announced its approval ofCombustion's tender offer
for all outstanding shares. The Respondents are former Basic shareholders who sold their
stock after Basic's first public statement of October 21, 1977, and before the suspension of
trading in December, 1978.
Id. at 227-28.
261
Id. at 230. Although the Court also addressed the question of whether the courts below
properly applied a presumption of reliance in certifying the class, rather than requiring each class
member to show direct reliance on Basic's statements, a discussion of this issue is not germane to the
subject matter of this article.
262

Id. at 231.
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making. '' 263 The Court, therefore, decided to "expressly adopt the TSC
264
Industries standard of materiality for the §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.
When analyzing the statements made by each of the defendants in the
five cases discussed above, there can be little doubt that they were all
material as defined by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries and Basic.265
Defendant Paul Johnson, in DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, issued a number
263

Id. (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448-49).

264

Id. at 232.

265

As noted in the discussion of the cases above, the following misstatements were alleged to be

made by the defendants.
Defendant
PaulJohnson

False and/or Misleading Statement
Following three separate public "buy" recommendations in a six

(DeMarco v.

month period following Corvis's initial public offering, Paul

Robertson Stephens, Inc.)

Johnson told a meeting of the Bayview investment committee that
he would buy Corvis stock at a price of $12 to $14 per share when
it had closed that day at approximately $24.50 per share. The
following day, Johnson sold 6,550 of the 8,175 shares that he
personally owned and Robert Stephens sold the shares that it held
through the Bayview Partnerships. See supra text accompanying
notes 29-34.

Shannon Terry and Theodore
Melcher (SEC v. Huttoe)

Jeffrey Vinik
(In re: Fidelity/Micron Securities
Litigation)

Douglas W. Colt

Jonathan G. Lebed

(1) Touting of publicly traded securities to potential investors in
articles that he wrote for the Whisper Newsletter in return for
undisclosed compensation from the issuers of those securities; (2)
Sale of his personal holdings in stocks as he was writing articles in
the Whisper Newsletter recommending their purchase; and (3)
Failure to disclose either of these practices when he solicited
subscriptions to the Whisper Newsletter. See supra text
accompanying notes 93-94.
"The valuations of semiconductor stocks were quite depressed
entering the [six month] period [preceding September 30, 1995].
Micron Technology is a good example of these dynamics at work.
Its stock price more than doubled during that period, yet earnings
grew so quickly that, in my view, the stock is still relatively cheap."
See supra text accompanying note 136.
Although the actual text of the false or misleading statements made
by Colt and his Fast-Trades associates are not known, their
postings on internet bulletin boards and their recommendations to
buyers about particular stocks in which they held an interest were
sufficient for demonstrating the requisite intent of the participants
and satisfied the requirements for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
violations. See supra Part II.D.1 and text accompanying notes 177223 (discussing these postings in general).
"FTEC is starting to break out! Next week, this thing will
EXPLODE.... Currently FTEC is trading forjust $2 1/2!I am
expecting to see FTEC at $20 VERY SOON." See supra note 231.
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of public buy recommendations for Corvis while he and a few of his
colleagues secretly sold their positions.266 His statements promoting Corvis
were material because his contradictory action of selling his shares exhibited
an intent to encourage the market to purchase a stock that he conversely sold
for his own benefit.
In Fidelity/Micron, although Defendant Jeffrey Vinik did not actually
make false statements about Micron, such as baseless projections about its
future share price, his actions of selling the stock were contrary to the high
level of praise that he gave the stock in various public statements that he
made. 267 As the manager of the world's largest mutual fund, his positive
statements about Micron were material because the investing public is
deemed to look to such highly esteemed market professionals in making
their own investment decisions and his words were contrary to his deeds.
Vinik's alleged motive for promoting Micron, which was one of the fund's
largest holdings, was to increase its share price prior to selling it.
Defendants Douglas Colt's and Jonathan Lebed's nearly identical conduct of purchasing a thinly traded company, disseminating mass quantities
of otherwise false information about the company, and then selling their
position while others bought the targeted stock and drove up its share price
is a classic example of a "pump and dump" scheme. There is no question
that their sole motive for releasing false information about the companies
that they targeted was material because they desired to use it to profit at the
hands of their unsuspecting victims. Similarly, the defendants in Huttoe
failed to disclose to subscribers of their newsletter that the companies gave
them stock in exchange for their recommendations. This information was
material because the victims of this scheme were misled into believing that
the recommendations they were receiving were based exclusively on the
independent research and analysis of the newsletter's authors. Like Colt and
Lebed, the Huttoe defendants sold their positions in the targeted stock at
substantial profits
while their victims purchased it and artificially inflated the
26 8
share price.
Once a finding about the materiality of a statement has been made, one
must consider whether to proceed to the second step of the analysis in
determining whether to impose liability for false and misleading statements
or omissions. While statements deemed immaterial are clearly not actionable and thus require no further analysis, statements found to be material are
266

See supra Part II.A. and accompanying footnotes for a discussion of Johnson's "buy"

recommendations for Corvis, which ran contrary to his actions of selling the stock.
267
See supra text accompanying note 136 (discussing of Vinik's public praise of Micron, 964 F.
Supp. 539).
268
Seegenerally SEC v. Huttoe, No. 96-2543GK, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211 (D.D.C. Sept. 14,
1998).
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potentially actionable and mandate additional considerations. In the second
phase of analysis, one must determine whether the source of materially false
and misleading or omitted information is subject to the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940.
B. Step Two: Is The Speaker Subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940?
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("'40 Act") defines, in relative part,
an investment adviser as "any person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a
regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities."269 In Lowe v. SEC, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he ['40]
Act was designed to apply to those persons engaged in the investmentadvisery profession-those who provide personalized advice attuned to a
client's concerns, whether by written or verbal communication. The mere
fact that a publication contains advice and comment about specific securities
does not give it the personalized character that identifies a professional
investment adviser."2 70 The '40 Act, however, most notably excludes from
/

269
270

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(11) (2004).
472 U.S. 181, 207-08 (1985). The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Lowe [was] the president and principal shareholder of a corporation (also a
petitioner) that was registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (Act). Because Lowe was convicted of various offenses involving investments, the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, after a hearing, ordered that the
corporation's registration be revoked and that Lowe not associate with any investment adviser.
Thereafter, the SEC brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that Lowe, the
corporation, and two other unregistered corporations (also petitioners) were violating the
['401 Act, and that Lowe was violating the SEC's order, by publishing, for paid subscribers,
purportedly semimonthly newsletters containing investment advice and commentary. After
determining that [P]etitioners' publications were protected by the First Amendment, the
District Court, denying for the most part the SEC's requested injunctive relief, held that the
Act must be construed to allow a publisher who is willing to comply with the Act's reporting
and disclosure requirements to register for the limited purpose of publishing such material
and to engage in such publishing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ['40] Act
does not distinguish between person-to-person advice and impersonal advice given in
publications, that [P]etitioners were engaged in business as "investment advisers" within the
meaning of the ['40] Act, and that the exclusion in §202(a)(l 1)(D) of the ['40] Act from the
['40] Act's definition of covered "investment advisers" for "the publisher of any bona fide
newspaper, news magazine, or business or financial publication of general and regular
circulation" did not apply to petitioners. Rejecting [the P]etitioners' constitutional claim, the

court further held that Lowe's history of criminal conduct justified the characterization of
petitioners' publications "as potentially deceptive commercial speech."

[On appeal, the
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its definition of an investment adviser, "the publisher of any bona fide
newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general
and regular circulation." 271 Discussing this exception, the Supreme Court

Supreme Court reversed and held that the] Petitioners' publications fall within the statutory
exclusion for bona fide publications [because the publications did] ["not offer individualized
advice attuned to any specific portfolio or to any client's particular needs." Lowe, 472 U.S.
at 208.] [In addition, the Court concluded that] none of the petitioners is an "investment
adviser" as defined in the ['40] Act, and therefore neither [the P]etitioners' unregistered
status nor the SEC order against Lowe provides a justification for restraining the future
publication of their newsletters.
Id. at 181.
271
Section 202(a)(1 1) of the '40 Act states:
(a) When used in this title [15 USCS §S80b-1 et seq.], unless the context otherwise requires,
the following definition shall apply:
(11) "Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities; but does not include (A) a bank, or any bank holding company as
defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which is not an investment company,
except that the term "investment adviser" includes any bank or bank holding company to the
extent that such bank or bank holding company serves or acts as an investment adviser to a
registered investment company, but if, in the case of a bank, such services or actions are
performed through a separately identifiable department or division, the department or
division, and not the bank itself, shall be deemed to be the investment adviser; (B) any lawyer,
accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of such services is solely incidental to
the practice of his profession; (C) any broker or dealer whose performance of such services
is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no
special compensation therefore; (D) the publisher ofany bona fide newspaper, news magazine
or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation; (E) any person whose
advice, analyses, or reports relate to no securities other than securities which are direct
obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States, or
securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the United States has a direct or
indirect interest which shall have been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant
to section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 USCS 578c(a)(12)], as
exempted securities for the purposes of that Act; or (F) such other persons not within the
intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. S80b-2(a)(11) (2004). In discussing the
exclusion of the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial
publication of general and regular circulation from the definition of investment adviser, the Supreme
Court stated that:
Although neither the text of the ['40] Act nor its legislative history defines the precise scope
of this exclusion, two points seem tolerably clear. Congress did not intend to exclude
publications that are distributed by investment advisers as a normal part of the business of
servicing their clients. The legislative history plainly demonstrates that Congress was
primarily interested in regulating the business of rendering personalized investment advice,
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stated that, "[p]resumably a 'bona fide' publication would be genuine in the
sense that it would contain disinterested commentary and analysis as
opposed to promotional material disseminated by a 'tout.' Moreover,
publications with a 'general and regular' circulation would not include
'people who send out bulletins from time to time on the advisability of
buying and selling stocks.' 272 Those deemed to be investment advisers
under the '40 Act are expressly prohibited from using the "mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly" to
engage in a fraudulent scheme.2 73
Defendant Paul Johnson in DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens and the
defendants in SEC v. Huttoe were not investment advisers under the'40 Act.
Although Johnson "as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities," his buy recommendations for
Corvis were not specifically targeted at any particular investor. 4 Rather, his
advice regarding Corvis was a general opinion aimed at any investor who
was willing to listen.2 7 ' Likewise, the defendants in Huttoe were not
including publishing activities that are a normal incident thereto. On the other hand,
Congress, plainly sensitive to First Amendment concerns, wanted to make clear that it did not
seek to regulate the press through the licensing of nonpersonalized publishing activities.

Lowe, 472 U.S. at 204.
272
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 206.
273

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §206, 15 U.S.C. §80b-6 (2004).

Section 206 of the

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 states in its entirety that:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud
or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or purchase any
security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than such client, knowingly
to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account of such client, without
disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of such transaction the
capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction.
The prohibitions ofthis paragraph (3) shall not apply to any transaction with
.customer
of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in
relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably desigsed to prevent, such acts,
practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
ld.
274
275

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(11) (2004).
The distinction between targeting a specific investor as opposed to a general recommendation

is dispositive because targeting specific investors provides the personalized character that identifies a
professional investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940
§202(a), 15 U.S.C. §80(b) (2004).
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investment advisers because of the broad nature of their recommendations.
Although subscribers of the Whisper Newsletter were small in number and
advice rendered was not specifically tailored to
paid a fee for the service, the
276
any particular subscriber.
In Fidelity/Micron,DefendantJeffreyVinikwas not an investment adviser
pursuant to the '40 Act. First, Vinik was not advising anyone about Micron.
Rather, he was stating his opinion about a stock that was a substantial
portion of the mutual fund that he managed. More than likely, Fidelity,
Vinik's employer, actually had one or more analysts covering Micron.
Second, Vinik was not compensated by any investor who received his
"advice." While Vinik was paid to advise and manage the Fidelity Magellan
Fund, he was not paid to advise either the fund's shareholders or the
investing public. Those who attempted to mirror Vinik's transactions in
their own personal accounts were merely doing so by their own accord,
which was incidental to Vinik's actions on behalf of Magellan because his
duty was owed to Magellan and not those individuals. Finally, Vinik's
statements about Micron were not targeted at any specific investor. Instead,
his alleged material misstatements were made in either a Magellan annual
report that was presumably sent to all of the funds' shareholders or on
nationally broadcast television programs.27 7
Defendants Douglas Colt and Jonathan Lebed were not investment
advisers as defined by the '40 Act. No defendant received any fee specifically
for the "advice" that they rendered to their victims. 278 In addition, neither
Colt nor Lebed offered "individualized advice attuned to any specific
portfolio or to any client's particular needs."279 The "advice" was broadly
targeted on the internet at anyone who was willing to read it. While
materially false and misleading statements made by investment advisers are
unquestionably actionable and thus, require no further analysis, statements
found to be made by parties who are not considered investment advisers
under the '40 Act, such as Colt and Lebed, require further examination. In
the third phase of determining whether to impose liability for false and
misleading statements, one must weight a number of additional factors.

276

See supra text accompanying note 83 (discussing the limited number of subscribers to the

Whisper newsletter).
277

See supra text accompanying note 136 (discussing Vinik's alleged misstatements).

See supra Part II.D.1 and accompanying notes 177-223 (discussing the six month
complementary trial offer that subscribers of Fast-Trades were given and the fact that no subscriber
actually paid Douglas Colt or any of his Fast-Trades associates a subscription fee).
279 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 208.
278
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C. Step Three: Additional Factors
In those cases where a party who is not considered an investment adviser
under the '40 Act has made materially false and/or misleading statements or
omissions, a number of additional factors should be weighed in deciding
whether to impose liability. The additional factors that must be assessed are
best understood when broken down into two sub-groups: (1) factors relating
to the source of the misinformation and (2) factors relating to the company
being misrepresented. 2"0 No single factor is in and of itself dispositive.
Although traditional analysis would address these factors in making a
materiality determination such as that discussed above in Step One, the
instant analysis addresses these factors separate and apart from a fact specific
materiality inquiry of the alleged fraudulent or misleading statement.
Therefore, these additional factors are used as a supplemental analysis to
determine liability for false and misleading statements made in connection
with a securities manipulation scheme.28'

1.

FACTORS RELATING TO THE SOURCE OF THE MISINFORMATION

In analyzing the factors relating to the source of information, one must
28 2
consider the age, investing experience and track record of the speaker.
*Whilecases where the inexperience of the speaker can be attributed to youth
weigh in favor of not imposing liability, cases such as Colt and Lebed where
the speaker made misrepresentations regarding these facts cut the opposite
way and lean towards a finding of liability. 2 3 When a speaker makes
280
See supra Part III.C.1 and 2 and accompanying notes (discussing factors relating to the source
of the misinformation and factors relating to the company being misrepresented that should be
considered in determining whether liability should be imposed for making false and misleading
statements about a public company).
2s91 In other words, some material statements made in violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5
thereunder should not impose liability upon their speaker when considered in the light of these
alternative factors.
282
But cf. US. v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001), where the defendant misrepresented that
he knew about debentures trading programs, knew their track record, and had experience investing in
them. It is important to note, however, that the ease in verifying or disproving the represented
information must also be considered. For example, while it is fairly easy to verify that an analyst has
spent the past ten years working at a high profile brokerage firm and has a history of picking successful
stocks, it is nearly impossible to verify such representations when they appear on the internet anywhere
other than the on a high profile brokerage firm's web page or in an email.
282
CompareJonathon Lebed who was fifteen years old at the time he allegedly violated §10(b)
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 with Shannon Terry who was twenty-eight when he allegedly
violated the same law. It would be nearly impossible to find a trier of fact who would disagree with the
proposition that a reasonable person should have no expectation of reliance upon investment advice
obtained form a minor.
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misrepresentations about their age, employer, or track record, further
analysis of their liability for making false and misleading statements must
proceed as if these misrepresentations were, in fact, true. Similar considerations must also be given to both the medium used to communicate the misleading information to the investing public and the reputation of that
medium. 2" For example, an analyst report coming from a venerable investment firm such as Fidelity or Robertson Stephens should carry substantially
more credibility than a market newsletter such as the Whisper Newsletter,
which is generated by unknown analysts who operate out of their house.
Likewise, the use of a medium such as an analyst report that is sent by a
reputable investment firm or made available on its website is a more reliable
source of information than the use of an email or message board posting
issued by someone who was most likely hiding their true identity." 5
2. FACTORS RELATING TO THE COMPANY BEING MISREPRESENTED
Turning next to the company being targeted by those engaged in a
scheme to disseminate materially false or misleading information with the
intent to induce others to either buy or sell securities in that company, a
number of similar factors must also be analyzed. The age, primary business
purpose and prior stock performance of the targeted company are critical
factors in deciding whether to impose liability for securities fraud.286 Newer
284

Compare statements made by Jeffrey Vinik in the Fidelity Magellan Fund Semiannual Report

with statements made by Douglass Colt in emails he sent from the Fast-Trades website. While the
investing public should be able to completely rely on any statement contained within an official
publication from a mutual fund company like Fidelity that is responsible for managing billions of dollars
in assets, the same cannot be said of an email sent from a website that has little to no verifiable history
of offering successful and/or impartial investment guidance.
285
Compare http://ml.com/media/15072 (section discussing Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc.) with
http://finance.yahoo.conVq/mb?s=PTEN (last visited March 27, 2005). Note that while the Merrill
Lynch website identifies the authors of its article on Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. by name and provides
their contact information, the postings that appear on finance.yahoo.com about the same company are
simply listed by individuals with anonymous onscreen names that rarely, if ever, have accurate contact
information.
286
Compare Coca-Cola Co. which "is the largest manufacturer, distributor and marketer of
nonalcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups in the world. Finished beverage products bearing
[Coke's] trademarks, sold in the United States since 1886, are now sold in more than 200 countries and
include the leading soft drink products in most of these countries (at http://www2.cocacola.com/investors/pdfs/form_10K_2004.pdf) and has a market capitalization in excess of $99 billion (at
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=KO) and has 10 stock splits since 1927 (at http://ir.thecocacolacompany.com/phoenixizhtml?c=94566&p= irol-dividends) with Argonaut Technologies, Inc. which
"develops innovative products designed to help pharmaceutical and other chemists engaged in the
discovery and development of new chemical entities increase their productivity and reduce their
operating costs without compromising the scientific integrity of their research." (at
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companies with small market capitalization that operate in a volatile business
sector such as technology are more suited to investors who are willing to
take the high degree of risk that is inherent in these types of securities.
Although one may argue that a willingness to accept extreme volatility
does not include a willingness to have the market in a given security
manipulated by fraud, reality dictates otherwise. A large number of the
high-tech start-up companies during the past decade have traded at
astronomical levels (particularly during the first few months following their
initial public offering), yet the price of these stocks are hundreds (and in
some cases over one-thousand) times the companies earnings.28 7 In these
cases, there is absolutely nojustification whatsoever for the lofty share price
of these companies. There is no substantial difference between the market
running up the price of one of these high-tech companies on the (often
false) belief that it will prove highly successful and the victims of a pump
and dump scheme doing the same. In both cases, the investors are buying
volatile stocks with the sole intent to receive a substantial return on their
investment in a relatively short period of time.
Other factors that must be explored about the companies targeted by
those seeking to manipulate the share price of that company through false
and misleading information include the share price (before, during and after
the manipulation), the trading volume (before, during and after the
manipulation) and the availability of information about the targeted
company."' The share price and trading volume of the targeted company
are particularly important in assessing whether liability should apply. 289 If
a company is thinly traded, as the majority of the stocks in classic "pump and
dump" schemes are, it does not take a substantial level of market interest (or
lack thereof) to move the share price one way or the other. 290 For example,
suppose that a little-known company is trading at $1 per share before a
manipulation scheme is initiated. At the height of the manipulation, the
shares of that company rise by $4 to trade at $5 per share, or an increase of

http://biz.yahoo.com/e/041112/agntlO-q.html) which has a market capitalization in excess of$18 million
(at http://finance.yahoo.comVq/ks?s=AGNT) and has only been publicly traded since 2000. (all websites
last visited March 27, 2005).
287
For example, Amazon.com (AMZN) went public in May, 1997. Amazon.com, Investor
Relations,at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p= irol-faq (last visited April 26,2004).
As of April 5, 2003, Amazon.com closed at $46.09 which represents a price to earnings ratio of 631.37.
Yahoo! Finance, at http://finance.yahoo.comq?s=AMZN (last visited April 5, 2004).
288
Seesupra notes 174, 183, 186, 192, 194, 197,202,204, 204,209,211,236,240,242, and 244-45
and accompanying text.
289
See supra notes 174,183, 186,192, 194, 197,202,204,204,209,211,236,240,242, and 244-45
and accompanying text.
290
See supra notes 187 and 234 and accompanying text.
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four hundred percent. Compare that result to a well-known company
trading at $50 per share prior to the initiation of a manipulation scheme.
While the share price also rises by $4 per share to $54, the increase is just
eight percent. Therefore, because the return potential for manipulating
small company stocks is substantially greater than larger company stocks,
those investing in smaller company stocks should be 1on guard and undertake
a higher degree of due diligence before investing.29
Finally, the doctrine of caveat emptor should be considered before
imposing liability on those who perpetrate fraudulent schemes to manipulate
the market by supplying it with materially false or misleading information.
In today's information age, data about any given security is readily available
around the clock. Anyone can log onto the internet and review SEC filings
at www.sec.gov or (most likely) the issuer's website. There are also
numerous websites, such as finance.yahoo.com and cbs.marketwatch.com,
which are devoted to supplying the public with current (nearly real time)
market information at a minimal or no charge. 2" In addition, there are
several television stations such as CNBC, MSNBC, Bloomberg TV and
CNN that are dedicated almost exclusively to covering the securities
market.293 Finally, analysts' reports (written by known and reputable
analysts) are easily obtainable with just a phone call or a mouse click.294
Considering these additional factors in relation to the five cases
discussed above in this article, the following conclusions about whether to
impose liability upon someone who makes materially false or misleading
statements about a security should be drawn. Defendant Paul Johnson
should be found liable for securities fraud. Johnson was an analyst with
Robertson Stephens, a highly regarded securities firm. The public should
have a high level of confidence in the advice that such analysts render to the
public and should be able to rely on such reports as being unbiased or, at the
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Technologies, Inc. On March 22, 2000 Lucent closed at $62.625, down $2.625 from the opening price
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maximum drop of $2.25 or 3.6% drop before the fraudulent press release was disavowed. See itifra notes
204-42 and accompanying text and http://www.sec.govAitigation/litreleasesArl6493.htm (last viewed
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very least, free of the taint of attempting to recognize personal gain by
market manipulation. Johnson clearly had a conflict of interest in Corvis
stock because although he thought it was a poor investment, he held a
sizeable position and wanted to sell it at a profit. In this case, Johnson
should be rightfully punished for his actions, if for no other reason than to
send a message to other analysts of his alleged caliber that such improprieties
will not be tolerated. Were Johnson allowed to retain any of his ill-gotten
gains, the investing public would have a substantially diminished reason to
put their confidence in the advice provided by analysts and the markets
would not be as efficient. 95
The defendants in SEC v. Huttoe should not be found liable for
securities fraud. Although these individuals charged subscriber fees for their
newsletter for worthless and misleading advice, a number of "additional
factors" preclude their liability. First, these defendants neither had (nor
apparently represented) any history nor skills as stock analysts.296 In fact,
they were so unknown that they were operating out of their house. Second,
the companies that they targeted were all thinly traded and lesser known
"high risk aggressive growth" companies.297 The share prices of the targeted
investments rose substantially in light of the fact that there was no other
source of public information able to substantiate the sudden increase or the
information being given in the newsletter.298 Had subscribers of the
Whisper Newsletter taken the time to investigate the credibility of the
analysts they were blindly trusting and then examined the quality of the
companies that were being recommended, they should have been able to see
the newsletter for what it was-a conduit for a fraudulent scheme. At the
very least, it should have become clear that this newsletter was an unreliable
source of market information. In such cases, the SEC should not expend its
limited resources on chasing after individuals who manipulate thinly traded
securities, especially when doing so may be at the expense of more pressing
matters. While some may argue that permitting such a fraud only
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be a good estimate of its intrinsic value.").
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http://johnreedstark.com/ClassMaterials/Opinions/huttoe.htm (last viewed April 2, 2005).
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encourages other would-be perpetrators to follow suit, in reality, it serves to
discourage such schemes by forcing the investing public to be more vigilant
with their investments and more diligent with respect to their investment
decisions.
DefendantJeffrey Vinik in Fidelity/Micronshould not be found liable for
securities fraud. In many ways, this is a hybrid case because although the
fund manager for the world's largest mutual fund clearly made positive
comments about Micron, when in fact, he sold the fund's position shortly
thereafter, he was not really directly advising anyone. 299 Although Vinik
worked for Fidelity, the world's most renowned mutual find company, and
was responsible for managing in excess of $50 billion, analysis of this case
boils down to duty. Vinik owed a fiduciary duty exclusively to Magellan
(and its investors) and not the market in general. Unlike Paul Johnson,
Vinik was neither acting as an analyst nor purporting to be one. The fact
that the market may have construed his positive statements about Micron,
a sizeable component of Magellan, as an indication to buy its stock is merely
incidental to his job as the fund's manager. During the period in question,
1995, Micron traded between roughly $18 and $55 per share.30 0 While the
stock was highly volatile, it was neither thinly traded nor thinly covered by
other analysts.3"' The market did not have to react to Vinik's praise of
Micron in light of the fact that a substantial amount of public information
about the company was readily available. Failing to find Vinik liable for
securities fraud would serve to apprise the market that it should not be
looking to mutual fund managers to play a dual role as analysts. This is
especially true considering that most mutual fund companies have
employees who exclusively serve as analysts.
Defendants Douglas Colt and Jonathan Lebed should not be found
liable for securities fraud. In fact, of any of the five cases discussed in this
article, Colt and Lebed are the two defendants who present the strongest
case for being found not liable. While Colt made up a false track record to
lend credibility to his website, Fast-Trades.com, and the stocks that it
targeted, Lebed, it is believed, never made any such representations in the
messages that he posted.30 2 Nonetheless, both Colt and Lebed targeted
thinly traded microcap stocks that were little known. The commonalities
between their targeted stocks demonstrates that had they disseminated the
same type of false information about a heavily traded stock, it would have
299
3Wo
301

See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
See http://www.micron.corm/ir/sec.html (last viewed July 20, 2005).
See http://www.marketwatch.conx/tools/quotes/snapshot.asp?symb = MU&vc =0&siteid =

mktw&dist=dropmenu and http://micron.com/ir/profile.html (last viewed April 3, 2005).
M
Although Lebed did tout stock with no basis for his recommendation, he did not provide
disclaimers or purport to be an expert.

296 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:243
had little or no effect on the market price because the relatively small
number ofvictims who received and then traded on Colt and Lebed's advice
pales in comparison to the number of people who invest in heavily traded
stocks or rely on analysts' reports. Furthermore, those stocks that are heavily
traded or covered by a number of analysts are less likely to be affected by
such misleading or false information. This is due to the fact that the market
quickly corrects itself due to the large number of investors and the vast
amount of coverage such stocks receive.3" 3
Another similarity between the Fast-Trades and Lebed schemes is that
the victims went looking-of all places-on the internet for investment
advice. While Colt placed ads on various bulletin boards advertising FastTrades, Lebedjust directly posted his false and misleading messages in these
electronic forums.30 4 Any reasonable person using the internet should have
a healthy level of skepticism about the quality and utility of the information
they obtain online. It is simply far too easy for those who post on bulletin
boards to adopt a false username, misrepresent their credentials, or generally
provide information that cannot be verified.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An old adage dictates that "you can't get something for nothing." Yet,
investors scour the market daily looking for a free nugget of information in
the hopes of getting ahead of everyone else. Despite the nearly improbable
odds of cashing in on an investment and making a mammoth profit, many
people keep trying to find that "sure thing" or the next "big winner." When
a "hot" stock tip is dropped onto the market by the perpetrator of a
fraudulent securities scheme, any investor can almost instantaneously check
to verify the credibility of the information. However, few of these victims
ever do. Whether it is laziness, lack of skepticism, or fear that their due
diligence efforts will result in the investment taking off without them is
unknown. But what is known is that the SEC simply does not have the
resources to be the investor's advocate for everyone all of the time despite
former Chairman Douglass' now infamous words.3 ' Therefore, should an
overly naive and/or greedy investor choose to blindly accept the advice of a
stranger, he must be willing to accept the inevitable financial consequences
that are soon to follow. Like lambs to the slaughter, some people simply
cannot resist the temptation to chase a fast buck in the securities markets.
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In such cases, the weak investor deserves the harsh dose of reality that will
soon set in while the fraudsters laugh all the way to the bank.

E.

1865

The
Law Review
Specialists
Western
Newspaper Publishing Company, Inc.
537 East Ohio Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
(800) 807-8833
www.westernpub.com

